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THE LEGACY OF THE
STUBBORN AND REBELLIOUS SON
Irene Merker Rosenberg*
Yale L. Rosenberg**

J.

INTRODUCTION

If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, that will not hearken
to the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother, and though they
chasten him, will not hearken unto them; then shall his father and
his mother lay hold on him, and bring him out unto the elders of
his city, and unto the gate of his place; and they shall say unto the
elders of his city: "This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he doth
not hearken to our voice; he is a glutton, and a drunkard." And
all the men of his city shall stone him with stones, that he die; so
shalt thou put away the evil from the midst of thee; and all Israel
shall hear, and fear.
Deuteronomy 21:18-21

I

twentieth century America, as in Biblical ,times, parents1 unable
to subdue their disobedient children are authorized to invoke the
coercive power of the state. 2 As recently as 1971, for example, the
N
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1. Although statutes authorizing proceedings against disobedient children generally permit any interested adult to commence such actions, a substantial portion of
these cases are initiated by parents. See notes 26-27 infra and accompanying text.
2. While the punishment of such children has decreased in severity, on a given
census day, June 30, 1971, there were 57,239 children in juvenile detention and correctional facilities in this country, of whom 44,140 were boys and 13,099 were girls.
Approximately 70 per cent of the girls and 23 per cent of the boys, one third of the
total, were held on the basis of noncriminal offenses such as truancy and incorrigibility. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE .ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
CHILDREN IN CUSTODY 6-9 (1971). "In fiscal 1971, public juvenile detention and
correctional facilities admitted over 600,000 persons . • •." Id. at 8. Moreover, the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) recently estimated that "[b]efore, during and after the adjudication process, one-half of [juvenile noncriminal]
status offenders spend time in a detention center. In addition, a large number of
status offenders are either detained or sentenced to serve time in city and county
jails." LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE .ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
PROGRAM ANNOUNCEMENT: DEINS11TUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS 4
(1975) [hereinafter LEAA ANNOUNCEMENT ON DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION]. "Reports of abuse, rape and suicide do not deter us from placing juveniles in jails under
conditions that are more punitive and harmful for them than for adults." M. LEVIN,
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONS, UNDER LocK AND KEY: JUVENILES IN JAILS AND DETENTION 1 (1974).
1097
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected constitutional challenges to the state's "stubborn child" law, 3 which at the time of its
original enactment in 1646 was patterned after the above-quoted
verse from Deuteronomy. 4 The court upheld an adjudication that an
adolescent girl who refused to submit to a medical examination, used
vulgar language, slammed doors, and stayed outside the home "probably talking with the boys," was a "stubborn child" within the meaning of the statute. 5
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutes that give
their courts jurisdiction over two forms of misconduct by children:
criminal law violations and so-called status offenses. The latter are
behavior patterns or activities of a noncriminal nature, such as incorrigibility, truancy, and running away from home, that are defined
to apply only to minors. Many statutes include both penal law
violations and noncriminal status offenses within their definitions
of juvenile delinquency. 6 Others limit delinquency to criminal violThe Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's most recent census report
does, however, indicate that the total number of children in juvenile detention and
correctional facilities, as well as the number of those who have committed noncriminal acts, is decreasing. As of June 30, 1973, the total number incarcerated was
45,694, (a decrease of 11,545 since June 30, 1971) of whom 4551 were guilty of
noncriminal offenses. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CHILDREN IN CuSTODY (Advance Report) 11 (1975). These statistics may be misleading, however, since it appears that the LEAA classifies as "delinquent" any child who is so labeled under state law. Id. at 3. As pointed out in
notes 6-13 infra and accompanying text, many states define delinquency to include
status offenses such as disobedience, and, even in some of those jurisdictions establishing a separate category for status offenders, the latter may be subsequently adjudicated delinquent if they persist in being disobedient in violation of a court order.
Thus, the actual number of incarcerated status offenders may be substantially larger.
3. Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, 270 N.E.2d 389 (1971).
4. The 1646 Massachusetts Bay Colony legislation, which also mandated the
death penalty, follows the language in Deuteronomy. See Katz and Schroeder, Disobeying a Fathers Voice: A Comment on Commonwealth v. Brasher, 57 MASS, L.Q,
43 (1972). See also Sidman, The Massachusetts Stubborn Child Law: Law and Order
in the Home, 6 FAM. L.Q. 33 (1972). Although the "stubborn child" statute was
repealed in 1973, MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 272, § 53, as amended, Nov. 21, 1973, disobedient children in Massachusetts remain within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
and are subject to sanction as "children in need of services." See MASS, ANN. LAws
ch. 119, § 39E (1975).
5. Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, - , 270 N.E.2d 389, 395 (1971).
6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(7) (1974): "'Delinquent child'
means a child who commits an act which if committed by an adult would constitute
a crime, or who is uncontrolled by his custodian or school authorities or who habitually so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or
others."
Ten other jurisdictions have similar statutes classifying status offenders as
juvenile delinquents. See ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(3) (1959); CONN. GEN, STAT.
ANN. § 17-53 (Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 31-5-7-4.1 (Bums Cum. Supp.
1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.2(13) (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN, § 260,015(5)
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ations and provide a separate category for status offenses. 7 These
(Cum. Supp. 1975); Miss. CODE ANN.§ 43-21-5(g) (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169:2 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. .ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(2) (Cum. Supp.
1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1103(9) (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-4 (1966).
In addition, in ten states, both children who commit criminal acts and those guilty
of status offenses are grouped together, without being labeled "delinquent" or "incorrigible"; instead, they are merely designated as children within the "jurisdiction" of
the court. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 571-11(1), (2) (Supp. 1974); !DAHo CODE§ 161803 (Cum. Supp. 1974); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.020 (Cum. Supp. 1974); ME.
REV. STAT. .ANN. tit. 15, § 2552 (Supp. 1975); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.2
(Cum. Supp. 1975); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.031 (1959); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.040
(1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.476 (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-77 (1953);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-158 (1975).
7. One of the first state statutes creating a separate status offender category, N.Y.
FAMILY CT. Acr § 712 (McKinney 1962), originally provided:
(a) "Juvenile Delinquent" means a person over seven and less than sixteen
years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a
crime.
(b) "Person in need of supervision" means a male less than sixteen years of age
and a female less than eighteen years of age who is an habitual truant or who
is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful
control of parent or other lawful authority.
The age differential between boys and girls was held unconstitutional in In re
Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972). The statute
has also been amended to clarify the definition of truancy. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr
§ 712(b) (McKinney 1975).
Twenty-nine other jurisdictions classify status offenders separately from delinquent children. ALAS. STAT. § 47.10.290(7) (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
8-201(12) (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-403(3) (Supp. 1975); CAL. WELP. &
INSTNS. CODE§ 601 (West Supp. 1976); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 19-1-103 (1973);
D.C. COD!, ANN. § 16-2301(8) (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-401(g) (Supp.
1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3 (Smith-Hurd 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
38-802(c), (d), (e), (f) (1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13: 1569(15) (West Supp.
1975); MD. ANN. CODE § 3-801(f) (1974); MASS. .ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39E
(1975); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 10-1203(13) (Cum. Supp. 1974); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 43-201(5) (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 4-45 (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 13-14-3(M) (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(5) (1969);
N.D. CENT. CODE§ 27-20-02(4) (1974); Omo REV. CODE ANN.§ 2151.022 (Cum.
Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § ll0l(c) (Cum. Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN.§ 14-l-3(G) (1969); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 26-8-7.1 (Supp. 1974);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-202 (Cum. Supp. 1974); TEX. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 51.03(b)
(Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 632(12) (Cum. Supp. 1975); WASH. REV.
CODE § 13.04.010 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.12(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-115.2(n) (Cum. Supp. 1975). Prior to July 1975, Florida law provided a separate PINS classification, which included truants, runaways and persistently disobedient children. FLA. LAws c. 26880, § 1 (1951), c. 29615, § 33 (1955).
By legislation effective July 1, 1975, the PINS statute was repealed, and truants and
runaways have instead been classified as dependent children. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
39.01(10) (Cum. Ann. Supp. 1975). A separate provision states that "an ungovernable child" is one who persistently disobeys parental demands and is beyond parental
control, and further specifies that
The first time a child is adjudicated as ungovernable, he may be defined and
treated as a dependent child . . . for the second and subsequent adjudications
for ungovernability, the child may be defined and treated as a delinquent child.
FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 39.01(10) (Cum. Ann. Supp. 1975). The amended statute eliminates all references to PINS and, notwithstanding the above quoted provision, it does
not provide for adjudication as an ungovernable. The section defining "adjudicatory
hearing" is limited to adjudications of delinquency or dependency. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39.01(27) (Cum. Ann. Supp. 1975). See generally Gilman, How To Retain Juris-
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statutes describe offenders within this category in ostensibly less oir
probrious terms,8 such as unruly, wayward, undisciplined or incorrigible children, 9 or as persons, children, minors, youths, or juveniles "in
need of supervision,"10 phrases from which the popular acronyms
"PINS," "CHINS," "MINS," "YINS," and "JINS" are derived. 11
Even in statutes with separate categorizations for status offenses,
however, the two forms of misconduct overlap, since some statusoffense statutes proscribe not only noncriminal behavior, but also
certain forms of criminal conduct, such as violations of city ordinances and minor midemeanors. 12 Similarly, some statutes define
delinquency to include both penal law violations and acts that are
basically status offenses, such as the breach of a condition of probation by a child previously adjudicated incorrigible. 13 Unless otherwise noted, this article will use the term "delinquency" to denote acts
diction over Status Offenses-Change Without Reform in Florida, 22 CRIME AND
DELINQ. 48 (1976).
8. "[N]ot surprisingly . • . there is indication that a new sort of stigma is attaching to being labeled a person or minor in need of supervision. That result is
probably unavoidable as long as any sort of -official action is taken. And action by
a court-however benign-is likely to be the most severely and permanently labeling
of all." THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YoUTII CRIME 26
(1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
9. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 8-201(12) (1974) (incorrigible); GA. CODE
ANN. § 24A-401(g) (Supp. 1975) (unruly); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(G) (1969)
(undisciplined); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-3 (G) (1969) (wayward). The Uniform Juvenile Court Act describes status offenders as unruly children. UNIFORM
JUVENILE COURT ACT§ 2(4).
Kansas has an elaborate statutory labeling process, based on the seriousness of
the child's offense and/or the number of times it has been repeated. Thus, a child
may be classified as either "truant," "traffic offender," "wayward," "miscreant," or
"delinquent." KAN. STAT. ANN.§§ 38-802(b), (c), (d), (e), (f) (1974).
10. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (minor);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1203(13) (Cum. Supp. 1974) (youth); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A: 4-45 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (juvenile); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-3(M)
(Supp. 1973) (child).
11. See NEWSWEEK, Sept. 8, 1915, at 66, col. 3; Editorial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10,
1975, at 34, col. 2 (late city ed.).
12. Tux. FAM. CODE ANN.§§ 51.03(b)(l)(A), (B) (Supp. 1975).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(2) (1969) states: "'Delinquent child' includes
any child who has committed any criminal offense under State law or under an ordinance of local government, including violations of the motor vehicle laws or a child
who has violated the conditions of his probation under this article." N.C. GEN,
STAT. § 7A-278(5) (1969) establishes a separate category dealing with the "undisciplined child," who is defined as "any child who is unlawfully absent from school
or who is regularly disobedient to his parents • • . and beyond their disciplinary control, or who is regularly found in places where it is unlawful for a child to be, or
who has run away from home." Thus, a child who has been adjudicated undisciplined on the basis of truancy and who subsequently violates a condition of probation
by further truancy may be adjudicated a delinquent. See In re Dowell, 17 N.C. App.
134, 193 S.E.2d 302 (1972).
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that would constitute crimes if committed by aDi adult, and the
acronym "PINS" and variant terms such as "incorrigibility" and
"supervision" to refer only to cases involving noncriminal behavior.
The juvenile court also has jurisdiction over actions that pertain to
"neglected" or "dependent" children,14 in which the parent is charged
with misconduct or an inability to care properly for the child. In
many jurisdictions, the behavior that is a ground for finding neglect
or dependency is also proscribed by the PINS law. 15 Thus, depending upon whether fault is assigned to the parent or to the child,
truancy can be the basis for either a neglect or a PINS finding. 16 This
interrelationship between the PINS and neglect jurisdictions is illustrated inferentially by statutes in a number of states that classify
runaways as PINS only when they leave home "without just cause,"17
and is more directly demonstrated by a New York statute that permits
substitution of a neglect charge at any stage of a PINS proceeding18
and by Arizona legislation that treats as "dependent" a child under
eight who commits a delinquent or PINS act. 19
A disturbing feature of many PINS statutes is the absence of a
lower limit on the age of children over whom jurisdiction may be
exercised. While a few states do prescribe lower age limits for PINS
children,20 most define "child" simply as a person under the age of
eighteen, seventeen, or sixteen. 21 The New York statute, for exam14. For example, MINN. SrAT. ANN. § 260.015(6)(a) (1971) defines a "dependent child" to include, inter alia, one "who is without a parent, guardian or other custodian ••.," while section 260.015(10) defines a "neglected child" as one who, inter
alia, "is abandoned by his parent, guardian, or other custodian" or "is without proper
parental care because of the faults or habits of his parents, guardian, or other custodian."
15. Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.12 (Cum. Supp. 1975), which includes as a
child "in need of supervision" one who "habitually so deports himself as to injure
or endanger the morals or health of himself or others," with Wis. STAT. ANN. §
48.13(1){f) (1957), which describes a "neglected" child as one whose "occupation,
behavior, condition, environment or associations are such as to injure or endanger
his welfare or that of others."
16. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-53 (1975) (includes in its definition
of "delinquent" child one "who has been habitually truant" and defines a "neglected"
child as one who "is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally,
emotionally, or morally . . ." [emphasis added]).
17. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-401(g)(4) (Supp. 1975).
18. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 716(b) (McKinney 1975). The same section permits substitution of a neglect petition in a delinquency case.
19. Aruz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 8-201(10)(c) (1974).
20. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(1)(A) (1975) (setting lower age
limit of ten for PINS and delinquents); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1103(9) (1962) (setting lower age limit of seven for "delinquent" children, the definition of which includes status offenders).
21. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(3) (1959) (under 16); HAWAII REV. SrAT.
§ 571-2(5) (Supp. 1974) (less than 18); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1569(3) (West
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ple, sets no minimum age for PINS, although it requires that a child
be over seven before- he or she can be adjudicated a delinquent. 22
Whether categorized separately or included within the definition
of delinquency, PINS conduct may be described either with particularity or with vague conclusory terms; some statutes combine specific
and vague proscriptions. A relatively precise Texas statute enumerates four types of misconduct that are the exclusive bases for a PINS
adjudication: (1) three violations of municipal penal ordinances or of
laws defining low-grade misdemeanors; (2) truancy for a specified
number of days; (3) leaving home for a substantial length of time or
without intent to return; or (4) violation of state laws prohibiting
driving while intoxicated. 23 In contrast, the more general Alabama
statute defines a "delinquent child" as a criminal law violator, or as
one "who is beyond the control of his parent . . ., incorrigible . . .
guilty of immoral conduct; ... [or] leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or
immoral life."24 More typically, Arizona combines somewhat specific
prohibitions against habitual truancy and running away from home
with vague proscriptions against disobeying reasonable parental orders or habitually deporting oneself so as to injure or endanger one's
morals or health. 25
In most jurisdictions, any person having knowledge of relevant
facts can refer a child to court on a PINS charge;26 typically, the
Supp. 1975) (less than 17). Cf. In re Joyner, 358 Mass. 60, 260 N.E.2d 664 (1970)
(reversing "stubborn child" adjudication against 18-year-old girl sentenced to ten days
in correctional facility for disobeying her parents' orders not to see her intended husband).
22. N.Y. FAMILY Cr. ACT § 712(a), (b) (McKinney 1975). The lower age
limit of seven in delinquency cases apparently stems from the conclusive commonlaw presumption that a child under that age was incapable of committing a crime.
Between the ages of seven and fourteen, there was a rebuttable presumption of incapacity. See generally F. LUDWIG, Youm AND TIIE LAw 17-18 (1955). There is
a split in the courts as to whether these presumptions are to be used in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Compare In re E.P., 291 S.2d 238 (Fla. App. 1974) (presumption available to 12-year-old child accused of manslaughter), with Borders v. United
States, 256 F.2d 458, 459 (5th Cir. 1958) (prosecution not required to prove that
12-year-old who derailed freight train was of sufficient maturity to understand the
nature and consequences of his conduct). See In re Gladys R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 464
P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970) (penal law codification of common-law presumption was applicable in delinquency actions, but suggesting that it would not be available in PINS cases); accord, In re Michael B., 44 Cal. App. 3d 443, 118 Cal. Rptr.
685 (1975). In those jurisdictions where the defense of infancy is available to delinquents and where PINS children can be sent to the same state institutions as delinquents, the infancy defense should be available to PINS.
23. TEX. FAM. CoDEANN. § 51.03(b) (Supp. 1975).
24. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(3) (1959).
25. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(12) (1974).
26. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-61 (1975); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 211.081
(1962). Some states require that the complainant be an adult. See, e.g., KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-816 (1974).
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referring party is either a parent, guardian, or custodian, or a school,
police or welfare official. 27 Over half of the states require that before
a petition is filed, the complainant and the child must utilize a process
known as "informal adjustment" or "probation intake."28 Its purpose is to assure that formal juvenile court intervention is reserved
exclusively for those children considered to be in need of judicial help
because of the seriousness of their offenses or the severity of their
maladjustment. 29 In general, the options available to an intake
department are outright dismissal of the case, dismissal with referral
to community agencies, informal supervision of the child, or the filing
of a formal PINS petition or complaint. 30
In some states, the parties may refuse to participate in the established intake procedure;31 moreover, a number of jurisdictions allow
27. For example, a recent New York survey discloses that parents or parental surrogates initiated 59 per cent of all PINS actions, 25 per cent were brought by school
officials, and the remaining 16 per cent were instituted by other parties, such as unrelated individuals and police. See ADMIN. Bo. OF N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT FOR JUDICIAL YEAR 1972-73, at 331 (1974). Another such study, involving 316
PINS children in New York City who were removed from their homes by court action, found that 65 per cent of the PINS petitions in the survey were filed by the
children's mothers. See OFFICE OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES OF TiiE NEW YORK JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, THE PINS CHILD, A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS 44 (1973) [hereinafter
THE PINS CHILD, A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS]. See also LEAA ANNOUNCEMENT ON
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 2, at 7-8.
28. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INSTNS. CoDB §§ 653, 654 (West Supp. 1976); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-304 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
In addition to such juvenile court diversionary processes, "[a]cross the country,
it is clear, discretionary action by the police in screening juvenile offend~rs accounts
for the removal of significant numbers from the formal juvenile justice system."
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 12. The Task Force notes, however, a special
data analysis of the Chicago Youth Division, which discloses that in 1965 the police
adjusted cases for every juvenile criminal offense category except murder (e.g., armed
robbery 30.5 per cent adjusted), but were able to adjust incorrigibility charges in only
19.5 per cent of the cases. Id. at 12 n.60.
29. A New York Family Court judge has explained the purpose of the intake procedure as follows: "[P]robation intake is a hallmark of the juvenile justice system.
Its purpose is to screen from the Court those youngsters who, because of age, lack
of prior record, good adjustment at home and in the community or other factors could
derive no benefit from court involvement and, indeed, might be damaged by it." In
re Charles C., 371 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585 (Fam. Ct. 1975). See also TASK FoRCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 14-18, 21; E. WAKIN, CHILDREN WITHOUT JUSTICE 40-42
(1975).
The statutes themselves often describe the purpose of the intake procedure in
vague, general terms. See, e.g., Aus. STAT. § 47.10.020 (1975) ("to determine
whether the interests of the public or of the minor require that further action be
taken"); UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT Acr § lO(a) (2).
30. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INSTNS. CoDE § 654 (West Supp. 1976); MoNT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 10-1209 (Cum. Supp. 1975); TASK FORCE REPORT, -supra note 8, at
15. Another form of adjustment, which generally takes place after the filing of a
petition, but prior to an adjudication, is the entry of a consent decree. See D.C.
CODE ANN.§ 16-23'14 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 11, § 50-305 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
31. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.§ 24A-1001(3) (Supp. 1975); Mo. CTs. & JUD. PRO.
CODE ANN. § 3-810(e) (Supp. 1975); UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT Acr § 10(a)(3).
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the complainant to file a petition against the child even though the
probation department recommends that the matter be informally
adjusted. 32 The net effect of these provisions is to give the parent or
other complaining party access to the court notwithstanding the contrary opinion of probation personnel, as well as power to bypass
community resources. 33
After the petition is filed, the court is usually required to decide
whether the child is to be released in the parent's custody or remanded
to a facility pending the adjudicatory hearing. 34 Statutory bases
for remand generally include a necessity for protection of the child or
the public, a likelihood that the child will abscond or fail to appear in
court on the return date, an unavailability of proper supervision at
home, and, finally, a probability that the child will commit a criminal
act before trial. 35 In practice, the determining factor may instead be
32. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-8(3) (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.Y. FAMCT. ACT § 734(b) (McKinney 1975) ("The probation service may not prevent
any person who wishes to file a petition under this article from having access to the
court for that purpose").
In some states, the complainant's access to court is limited by requirements that
the judge authorize the filing of each petition. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN,
§ 712A.11 (1968); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-11 (1969). In the District of
Columbia, only designated public officials and representatives of private agencies may
file PINS complaints. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2305(b) (1973). Under California
law, if a probation officer declines to file a petition against a juvenile, the person
initiating the complaint against the child may secure review by the court of the officer's decision. CAL. WELP. & INSTNS. CODE§ 655 (West 1972).
33. For a discussion of the dynamics of intake adjustment in the New York Family Court, see Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdictio11, 83 YALE L.J,
1383, 1395 (1974) [hereinafter YALE PINS STUDY].
34. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-63 (1975); ME. REV, STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 2608 (Supp. 1975). Indeed, children may be held in detention even prior to
the filing of a PINS petition. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 10-1209(4)(c),
10-1212 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Tux. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.02 (1975).
35. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.171 (subd. 1) (1971); N.Y. FAMILY CT,
ACT§ 739(a) (McKinney 1975): UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT§ 14. Some state
statutes do not prescribe grounds for remanding the child, and consequently such decisions appear to be left entirely to the discretion of individual judges, See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-63 (1975); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2608 (Supp.
1975) (also authorizes jail detention of children provided they are segregated from
adult criminal offenders).
The New York statute permits interim detention of both PINS and delinquents
if the court finds that there is either a "substantial probability" that the child will
not retum to court or a "serious risk" that the juvenile may commit a crime. N.Y.
FAMILY CT. ACT §§ 739(a), (b) (McKinney 1975). In People ex rel. Waybum v.
Schupf, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1976, at 1, col. 6, the New York Court of Appeals upheld
the constitutionality of the above preventive detention provision. See also Moss v.
Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1976), holding unconstitutional the Florida juvenile
court procedure for pre-trial detention of juvenile delinquents on the ground that it
failed to provide for a probable cause hearing. The decision does not appear to apply
to PINS cases. 525 F.2d at 1260 n.1.

ILY
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the parent's willingness to take the child home. 36 In many jurisdictions, PINS and delinquent children who are detained during this
interim period are placed in the same facilities, which are likely to be
secure. 37 Interim detention may continue until the conclusion of the
dispositional hearing; thus, both alleged and adjudicated PINS and
36. A study of the New York Family Court indicates that approximately 50 per
cent of the interim PINS detentions are based on parental refusal to take the child
home. See YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1396-97. Another survey disclosed
that 20 per cent of the parents refused to take their children home. THE PINS
CHILD, A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS, supra note 27, at 44. But see In re Norman c.,
74 Misc. 2d 710, 345 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Fam. Ct. 1973), holding that secure detention
for a child accused of delinquency solely on the ground that he bad no parent to
whom he could be paroled constituted a clenial of equal protection. Some jurisdictions have attempted to provide alternatives to interim detention of PINS children
in secure facilities. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2313(b) (1973) (permitting detention in foster homes, group homes and youth shelters).
Pursuant to section 223(a){12) of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12) (Supp. IV), the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has set aside 8.5 million dollars for grants to public and private
agencies that have formulated programs to divert PINS children from detention and
correctional facilities. See News Release accompanying LEAA ANNOUNCEMENT ON
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 2.
37. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 379 (1958); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-226
(A) (Supp. 1975); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.34 (Page Supp. 1974); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 50-311 (Cum. Supp. 1975). The Alabama statute authorizes interim
detention of delinquent children in jail but segregated from adult prisoners, "provided
no other arrangement for holding the child can be made." The term "delinquent"
is defined so as to include status offenders. ALA. CODE, tit. 13, § 350(3) (1958).
In the District of Columbia, PINS children can be placed in secure detention so
long as they are not commingled with adjudicated delinquents. D.C. CODE ANN. §
16-2313(b) (1973). In Georgia, neglected and PINS children may only be detained
in shelter care facilities; however, such facilities may also house delinquents. GA.
CODE ANN. § 24A-1403(b) (Supp. 1975). Since June 30, 1975, Louisiana has prohibited the holding of PINS children in detention facilities. LA. REv. STAT. §
13:1578.1 (West Supp. 1975).
See Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), 359 F. Supp. 478
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (determining that PINS children held in secure interim detention
facilities for more than 30 days are entitled to treatment, but rejecting claim that
secure detention of PINS with delinquents violates equal protection); People ex rel.
Kaufmann v. Davis, App. Div., 2d Dept, N.Y.L.J., May 19, 1976, at 19, col. 6 (holding that commingling of PINS child with delinquents in secure interim detention facility was not unconstitutional, where PINS child was detained 15 days, had previously run away from nonsecure facility, and was assaultive). Cf. Swansey v. Elrod,
386 F. Supp. 1138, 1141-42 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (discussing internal separation of delinquents and PINS remanded to the same juvenile detention center, in connection with
determination as to propriety of keeping juveniles waived over to criminal court in
the same facility); Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347 (6th Cir. 1974), reversing trial
court's dismissal of a class action to enjoin allegedly unconstitutional arrest and jailing practices by juvenile officials. Plaintiff, a 16-year-old boy, was arrested for violation of a curfew ordinance, taken to the county jail, and kept there incommunicado
for five days on the basis of a telephone order by the nonlawyer juvenile court judge.
"The willingness of the court to order confinement without having seen or heard from
the boy and without having personally observed his conduct or his character, indicates to us that his order was not merely an isolated act, but instead the usual treatment given to all juveniles arrested for being out after curfew." 506 F.2d at 1355.
See also Anonymous Juvenile v. Collins, 21 Ariz. App. 140, 517 P.2d 98 (1973).
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delinquent children may be incarcerated together for extended periods of time.88
Most jurisdictions provide for bifurcated trials or hearings, with
an adjudicatory or fact-finding hearing to determine innocence or
guilt as to the charges, and a dispositional hearing to decide what
treatment, if any, the guilty child requires. 39 Many states require that
evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing be material, relevant
38. See, e.g., Tl!x. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.0l(h) (1975); Martarella v. Kelley,
349 F. Supp. 575, 579, 582-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see D.C. CoDB ANN. § 16-2313
(b) (Supp. 1970). As a matter of practice, children may also be kept in detention
facilities even after the dispositional hearing pending transfer to a long-term placement facility. See State ex rel. Harris v. Larson, 64 Wis. 2d 521, 219 N.W.2d 335
(1974).
39. See, e.g., In re D.J.B., 18 Cal. App. 3d 782, 785-86, 96 Cal. Rptr. 146, 14849 (1971), (reversing PINS adjudication because record was unclear as to whether
the trial judge considered a probation report prior to making a PINS finding against
the child; the court rejected the prosecutor's argument that bifurcated hearings were
not required in PINS cases). See also In re Arnold, 12 Md. App. 384, 394, 278
A.2d 658, 663 (1971) (remanding delinquency case because, inter alia, "the adjudicatory hearing ••. and disposition hearing ••. are interwoven"); cf. In re Nawrocki,
15 Md. App. 252,289 A.2d 846 (1972).
In some states, a mere finding that the child committed the acts alleged in the
petition appears sufficient to permit the court to adjudicate the juvenile a PINS and
proceed to enter a dispositional order. See, e.g., MAss. .ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 390
(1915); In re A.S., 487 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. App. 1972).
In other jurisdictions, in addition to determining that the child engaged in the
misconduct alleged in the petition, the court must, either prior to making a PINS
adjudication or prior to entering a dispositional order, also find that the minor is in
need of rehabilitation or treatment. In some of these states, it is unclear whether
adjudication of the child's status as a PINS takes place prior to or after a separate
finding that he or she is in need of rehabilitation or treatment. Compare CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-68(a) (1975) and N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr §§ 742, 743, 745(b)
(McKinney 1975) (PINS adjudication appears to take place only after finding of
need for rehabilitation or treatment), with LA. REv. STAT. §§ 13:1569(15), (18),
(19) (West Supp. 1975) (ambiguous as to when the PINS adjudication occurs). In
jurisdictions in which the adjudicatory hearing has been denominated a fact-finding
hearing, and the scope of such hearings is limited to determining whether or not the
child committed the acts alleged in the petition, it seems reasonable to infer that the
PINS adjudication can be entered only after the finding of a need for rehabilitation
or treatment has been made. See D.C. CODB ANN. §§ 16-2301(8), (16), (17)
(1973 ).
If the finding as to treatment and rehabilitation takes place at the adjudicatory
hearing, it should be subject to the rules of evidence and quantum of proof requirements applicable to adjudicatory hearings. If, however, the finding as to care and
rehabilitation is made at the dispositional bearing, it may be based on hearsay evidence and a lesser standard of proof. See notes 40-42 infra and accompanying text.
Ambiguities as to the hearing at which the finding of need for care and treatment
is made and as to the applicable rules of evidence and quantum of proof are removed
in some states by clearly defined tripartite procedures. In the first phase, the court
must find, by competent proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the child committed
the acts alleged. In the second phase, it must find, on the basis of clear and convincing competent evidence, that the juvenile is in need of care and rehabilitation, while
in the final phase, the judge may use incompetent evidence, provided it is material
and relevant, in order to determine the appropriate disposition. See N.M. STAT. ANN,
§§ 13-14-28(E), (F), (G), 13-14-31(C) (Supp. 1973).
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and competent. 40 In addition, some jurisdictions incorporate certain
procedural due process rights, such as the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, that are applicable in criminal trials and delinquency hearings. 41
At the dispositional hearing, the rules of evidence are substantially relaxed, permitting the court to receive probation reports and
other forms of hearsay evidence. 42 Most statutes give the judge
broad discretion, 43 authorizing such dispositional alternatives as discharge with a warning, 44 imposition of a fine, 45 probation,46 place40. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY Cr. ACT § 744(a) (McKinney 1975); Tux. FAM.
CODE ANN.§ 54.03(d) (1975).
Some state statutes merely provide that hearings shall be conducted in an "informal" or "informal but orderly" manner. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155
(1) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 11, § 50-316(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975); UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT §§ 24(a), 29(c). See also Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 214 Va.
142, 198 S.E.2d 633 (1973) (reversing incorrigibility adjudication because trial court,
over objection, admitted prejudicial hearsay testimony); In re Dudley, 310 S.2d 919
{Miss. 1975) (reversing adjudication that appears to have been based on noncriminal
conduct, on the ground that the quantum of inadmissible hearsay testimony was such
that appellant was effectively denied his right to a fair hearing).
41. See, e.g., Cor.o. RF.v. SrAT. ANN. § 19-3-106(1) (1973); MAss. ANN. I.Aws
ch. 119, § 390 (1975). Legislation in some states provides for the exclusion of illegally seized evidence and involuntary confessions in PINS and delinquency cases.
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-25(C) (Supp. 1973); Tux. FAM. CoDE ANN. §
54.03(e) (1975). See also notes 117-22 infra and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., !LL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972); ORE. RF.v.
STAT. § 419.500(2) (1974). See also Tyler v. State, 512 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974) (rejecting delinquent's claim that statute permitting introduction of hearsay evidence at dispositional hearing violated child's sixth amendment right of confrontation and cross-examination, on the ground that the juvenile's attorney had access
to all written reports considered by the court, and that In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967), discussed at notes 117-18 infra and accompanying text, is inapplicable
to post-adjudicative hearings).
43. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-112 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 937(b)(15) (1974) (the court may "fp]rescribe such other treatment, punishment, or care as in the opinion of the Court would best serve the needs of the child
and society"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 11, § 50-322 (Cum. Supp. 1975) ("ff]he court
may make • • • orders of disposition best suited to • . . [the child's] treatment, supervision, rehabilitation, and welfare: .••"). Compare N.Y. FAMILY Cr. ACT §
745(b) (McKinney 1975), which requires that the disposition be based on a preponderance of the evidence.
See also City & County v. Juvenile Court, 182 Colo. 157, 511 P.2d 898 (1973)
(upholding power of juvenile court judge to place child ·in a specified facility); In
re Debra A., 48 Cal. App. 3d 327, 330, 121 Cal. Rptr. 757, 759 (1975) (reversing
delinquency disposition upon condition that girl spend five consecutive weekends in
a detention center facility to be selected by the probation officer, on the ground that
the judge had improperly delegated his discretion; the court added that "[w]e need
not determine here whether 'punitive' detention (if made reasonably to effect 'rehabilitation') is within the purview of the juvenile court law").
44. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr § 754(a) (McKinney 1975).
45. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 937(b) (11) (1974).
46. See, e.g., Aluz. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 8-241 (A) (2)(b) (1974).
Any technical violation of rules of probation can result in revocation and institutional placement. See, e.g., In re Green, 203 S.2d 470 (Miss. 1967), cert. denied,
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ment in a foster home47 or nonsecure residential facility, 48 commitment to a secure industrial or training school, 40 or even detention in
an adult jail.50 Whereas some states absolutely prohibit placement of
PINS children together with delinquents in training schools, 01 others
prohibit only an initial placement, but permit subsequent commingling if the PINS child continues to misbehave. 02 Many jurisdictions,
however, have imposed no restrictions on the placement of the two
types of children together in the same facilities. 63
In many states, PINS children may be institutionalized for limited
terms, with the possibility of extensions pursuant to court order. 64 In
392 U.S. 945 (1968) (probation revoked on the basis of one day of truancy and creation of disturbance of classes at another school); Echols v. State, 481 S.W.2d 160
(Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (probation revoked for truancy, notwithstanding evidence of
parent's and child's reasonable beliefs that the latter was lawfully discharged from
school and had a valid work permit, and even though the child was employed), But
see In re D.E.P., 512 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (reversing probation revocation on the grounds that a single curfew violation was supported only by hearsay
and that the child's truancy was due to circumstances beyond his control; the court
noted that "the slightest technical violation" does not justify revocation and training
school commitment, 512 S.W.2d at 791). See also In re E.B., 525 S.W.2d 543 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975) (discussing differing statutory rights of PINS and delinquents to
trial by jury at probation revocation proceedings).
47. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & lNsTNs. CoDE §§ 730 (West 1972), 727(c) (West
Supp. 1976).
48. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 7A-286(4) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
49. See, e.g., .ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-221 (1964).
50. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169:14 (Supp. 1973) (after the child be•
comes 17, "the court may, under its continuing jurisdiction, commit him either to the
industrial school, house of correction, jail, or state prison, for all or any part of the
term of his minority"); IDAHO CODE§ 16-1814(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (permits commitment of a child to jail for up to 30 days if segregated from adult offenders). Cf,
Long v. Powell, 388 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (three-judge court) (holding unconstitutional as applied a Georgia statute permitting commitment of delinquent and
unruly children to adult penal institutions, and further holding that juveniles not
amenable to ordinary treatment and rehabilitation at juvenile training schools must
be provided appropriate facilities). The judgment in this matter was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court with directions to dismiss the case as moot. Powell
v. Long, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
51. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 39G (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 1314-31(C), (D) (Supp. 1973).
52. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INSTNS. CODE §§ 602 (West Supp. 1976), 730, 777
(West 1972); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2320{d) (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT, § 7A-278(2)
(1969).
53. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-68 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 161814 (Cum. Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 31-5-7-15 (Bums Cum, Supp,
1975).
54. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-8-105(2) (1973) (initial commitment
is indeterminate up to two years, and court after hearing may extend commitment
for additional period of not more than two years); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN, § 1769 (Supp. 1975) (same); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 756 (McKinney 1975) (initial
placement for 18 months which can be extended after court hearings for successive
one-year periods). See People ex rel. Schinitsky v. Cohen, 34 App. Div. 2d 1020,
312 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (2d Dept. 1970) {per curiam) (holding invalid mmc pro tu11c
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other jurisdictions, a PINS child is formally committed until his or her
majority, with early release dependent upon the discretion of the
juvenile court or the correctional agency. 55 Thus, depending on the
jurisdiction and on the juvenile's age, a child may receive what
amounts to a sentence of several years for running away from home. 56
Although many PINS statutes are characterized by vague proscriptions, drastic sanctions can often be invoked for their violation.
These two factors, among others, have combined to allow much
misuse and abuse of the PINS jurisdiction. Despite attempts to
abolish it, the PINS jurisdiction has displayed remarkable tenacity
and longevity. Accordingly, methods should be developed to ensure
at least that the court's awesome power is used sparingly and wisely.
To that end, this article will, in Part II, outline the abuses and
misuses of the PINS jurisdiction, and, in Part ill, discuss the challenges that have been raised against it. In Part N it explores the
value of an adjudicatory hearing in combatting PINS abuses. Finally,
Part V assesses the potential defenses and affirmative defenses57
extension of a PINS child's placement; due to a clerical error, there was a ten-month
delay in requesting the extension); People ex rel. Arthur F. v. Hill, 29 N.Y.2d 17,
271 N.E.2d 911, 323 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1971) (holding unconstitutional an extension
of placement without notice and a hearing).
55. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 54.05(b) (1975) (until age 18); NEB. RBv.
STAT. § 43-210.02 (1974) (until age 20); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-6 (1969)
(until age 21).
Children may be paroled from training schools prior to completion of the term
stated in the commitment order. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE FAMILY CoURT IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, JUVENILE
JUSTICE CONFOUNDED: PRETENSIONS AND REALITIES OF 'TREATMENT SERVICES 36
(1972) [hereinafter JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED]. However, after release they
remain subject to parole supervision and may be returned to the training school for
parole violations. See People ex rel. Silbert v. Cohen, 29 N.Y.2d 12, 271 N.E.2d
908, 323 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1971) (holding that parole of a delinquent may not be revoked without a hearing).
56. See E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (Cadena,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970) ("Under our statute a child of ten
may be deprived of bis liberty for a period of eleven years. Appellant here faces
confinement for almost seven years").
57. In the criminal law context, the ultimate burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt is on the state in the case of a "defense," whereas an "affirmative defense" must generally be proved by the defendant
In those jurisdictions in which the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is applicable in PINS proceedings, see note 122 infra, it is arguable that at least some
of the defenses outlined in this article constitute material elements of the offense,
the proof of which lies with the state. For example, the absence of contributozy neglect by the parent, a defense described in the text at notes 256-83 infra, can be considered a material element of proof of the child's incorrigibility, the burden of which
rests with the prosecution. Cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), holding
unconstitutional a Maine statute which required the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the mitigating factors which would reduce a murder charge
to manslaughter.
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that are arguably available, but have been only sporadically asserted
in PINS actions.

Il. MISUSE AND ABUSE OF THE PINS JURISDICTION
The potential for misuse of the PINS jurisdiction is illustrated by
the following case history. 58 A PINS petition was filed against a
fourteen-year-old girl who had allegedly run away from her parents'
home. Three months before being brought to court, the child, a
product of "an unstable family situation,"G 0 had attempted suicide by
slashing her wrists. As a result of the PINS petition, she was
committed for nine months to a state mental hospital, which delivered
a diagnosis of "schizophrenic reaction, schizoaffective type." 00 Upon
her release from the hospital, she was found to be a PINS, and
custody was transferred from her parents to an aunt and uncle.
Within a month, she threatened a fellow student and was sent home
from school. After being advised by her aunt that she might be
returned to a detention center as a result of this incident, the child
attempted suicide by taking an overdose of prescription drugs because, as she later stated, "it would be better to be dead than to be
returned to the juvenile hall." 61 Her probation officer filed a petition
alleging that she was a delinquent because she attempted to do herself
bodily harm, thereby violating the court's earlier PINS order. 62 At a
judicial hearing, the child admitted the allegations of the petition, was
found to be a delinquent, and was placed at the state training school.
The appellate court reversed on the ground that there had been
ineffective waivers of the right to counsel and the privilege against
self-incrimination. The court further observed that a delinquency
finding would be invalid because the suicide attempt was not "an act
of disobedience" constituting a violation of a court order, but rather
"a repeated manifestation of emotional disturbance." 63
This case suggests at least two ways in which the PINS jurisdic- ,
tion lends itself to misuse. First, the lower court classified a possibly
58. In re Butterfield, 253 Cal. App. 2d 794, 61 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1967).
59. 253 Cal. App. 2d at 795, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
60. 253 Cal. App. 2d at 796, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
61. 253 Cal. App. 2d at 796, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
62. Under CAL. WELF. & INSTNS. CoDE. § 602 (West Supp. 1976), a juvenile delinquent is defined as a child who violates the criminal law or an adjudicated PINS
who "fails to obey any lawful order of the juvenile court . . • ." Only delinquents
and PINS whose dispositions have been modified after violation of a court order may
be committed to the state training school. CAL. WELF. & lNSTNS, CODE §§ 730, 731,
777 (West 1972). Other states have similar provisions. See text at notes 81-84
infra.

63. 253 Cal. App. 2d at 800, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
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neglected, emotionally disturbed girl as a PINS. Second, it later combined the dubious PINS dispositional order with the renewed manifestation of the same emotional disturbance to convert the child's
status to that of a delinquent, and thus to incarcerate her with
juveniles who had committed crimes.
In a substantial number of reported cases, children designated as
PINS appear to be either neglected or the victims of parental inadequacies. Some opinions merely allude to such factors as prior findings of neglect or dependency, 64 an "unstable home situation," 65
parental inability or unwillingness to care for the child66 or
"maintain a well-kept home," 67 and juvenile misconduct that may
have resulted from "traumatic situations initiated by the parent." 68 In
other cases, the courts have been more explicit, noting, in various
instances, that a child had suffered from "poor nutrition and physical
care," 60 that a "home was 'filthy with food, clothing and debris
scattered about,' " 70 and that a child's running away had "its genesis
in unwholesome and often bizarre home environment and family
tensions." 71 Still more graphically, one court described a child "liv64. See In re Rita P., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 95 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1970); In re
Elmore, 382 F.2d 125, 128 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also In re Henderson, 199
N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 1972) (simultaneous findings of PINS and dependency).
65. In re M.S., 129 N.J. Super. 61, 64, 322 A.2d 202, 204 (Essex County Ct.
1974). See also In re K.E.S., 134 Ga. App. 843, 844, 216 S.E.2d 670, 671 (1975)
(delinquency proceeding based on violation of PINS probation order, involving "fifteen-year-old girl, the product of an unstable home environment including tragic family deaths and a mother who has been married six times").
66. In re Presley, 47 Ill. 2d 50, 52,264 N.E.2d 177, 180 (1970) (combined PINS
and neglect petition alleging that the child left home and that her parents forced her
to do so). See In re Potter, 237 N.W.2d 461, 462 (Iowa 1976) ("Parents experienced
poor health and were unable to provide adequate supervision and guidance"; child
ran away from several foster homes, was subsequently diagnosed as suffering from
a" 'manic-depressive reaction'" and was placed at state training school).
67. In re Mario, 65 Misc. 2d 708, 714, 317 N.Y.S.2d 659, 665 (Fam. Ct. 1971).
68. In re Henry G., 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 285, 104 Cal. Rptr. 585, 591 (1972).
69. In. re L.L., 39 Cal. App. 3d 205, 207, 114 Cal. Rptr. 11, 13 (1974).
Based on a dependency order entered against the child's parents, the trial judge committed a chronically depressed child to the state mental hospital; his alleged PINS
conduct consisted of running away from the hospital and claiming he was not insane.
39 Cal. App. 3d at 208 n.3, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 13 n.3. The appellate court granted
the writ of habeas corpus, holding that the juvenile court act did not authorize placement in a state mental hospital and ordering that the child's court record be expunged. See note 74 infra and accompanying text. See also In re Michael E., 123
Cal. Rptr. 103, 107, 538 P.2d 231, 234-35 (1975) (citing the L.L. case with approval).
10. In re Paul H., 47 App. Div. 2d 853, 854, 365 N.Y.S.2d 900, 902 (2d Dept.
1975) (per curiam) (child alleged to be truant; father who was unable to supervise
his son adequately accepted most of the blame for son's truancy).
11. In re Arlene H., 38 App. Div. 2d 570, 571, 328 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253 (2d Dept.
1971). These "family tensions" included a mother with a history of mental instabil-
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ing in rooms. . reeking with the effluvia of neglect," whose parents
were "inebriates" and whose mother "encouraged [him] in truancy."12
In some of these cases, the neglected child has been adjudicated a
PINS as a result of deficiencies in the state's placement procedures or
facilities. For example, one neglected child ran away from a temporary shelter in which he had been kept for over a year, during which
time the state could find no suitable foster home or facility. 73 In
another case, a dependent child, diagnosed as suffering from a "depressive reaction, chronic," and placed in a state mental hospital, fled
the institution because he allegedly had "been tied to his bed . . . for
many weeks," and had "been administered . . . anti-psychotic and
tranquilizing drugs against his will." 74 Another dependent child was
brought to court under a PINS petition for refusing to go to a foster
home, the third in which she had been placed in as many years. 7G
ity and shifting of the child's custody between separated parents for "seven or eight
years." 38 App. Div. 2d at 571, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
72. In re Lloyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 386, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (1st Dept.
1970).
73. In re Lloyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1st Dept. 1970). Cf.
In re Dennis M., 370 N.Y.S.2d 458, 82 Misc. 2d 802 (Fam. Ct. 1975), describing
a retarded schizophrenic child who was adjudicated neglected, removed from his
home, and was subsequently held in temporary shelters for four and a half years,
because of an inability to find longterm placement for him. 'The evidence elicited
in this case shows that Dennis is not the only child for whom the Commissioner
has been unable to provide longterm care within a reasonable period of time." 370
N.Y.S.2d at 462, 82 Misc. 2d at 806. See also Robinson v. Leahy, 401 F. Supp. 1027
(N.D. Ill. 1975) (describing an adolescent child committed to the Department of
Corrections on the basis of theft from his father; boy had been in residential centers
and mental health facilities almost continuously since the age of three, when he was
adjudicated a ward of court); JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED, supra note 55, at 6064 (discussion of 95 PINS children placed with the Commissioner of Social Services;
after nine months, 41 per cent remained in temporary shelter care and 25 per cent
had been returned to court because they could not be maintained in the shelter).
14. In re L.L, 39 Cal. App. 3d 205, 208, 209, 114 Cal. Rptr. 11, 13, 14 (1974),
See also JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED, supra note 55, at 67-87 (describing the
paucity of services available for mentally disturbed children in New York City and
in state hospitals); Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (threejudge court) (holding as constitutional on their face, New York laws regarding religious matching of children placed with private institutions; plaintiffs claimed these
statutory provisions discriminated against children who were Black and Protestant),
15. In re Rita P., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 95 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1970). See In re
Aline D., 14 Cal. 3d 557, 536 P.2d 65, 121 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1975), in which the
court reversed the commitment of a delinquent to the state training school, on the
ground that there was evidence that such placement would not be beneficial to the
child. It is unclear whether the girl was adjudicated a delinquent on the basis of
criminal acts or for violation of a court order. She was 16 years old, had an I.Q.
of 67, and had been rejected by her mother and previously placed in many treatment
facilities without success. The court remanded for reconsideration, stating that if it
was determined that the child would not benefit from the training school and "if no
appropriate alternative placement exists at that time, then the proceedings should be
dismissed." 14 Cal. 3d at 566, 536 P.2d at 70, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
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Observations of the juvenile court at the trial leveF 6 suggest that
both tactical and psychological factors may influence juvenile court
personnel to proceed against a child as a PINS, rather than against a
parent for neglect. There is less hesitancy in prosecuting a neglect
case if the child is young and the parent's misconduct overt, because
no one in the juvenile court system is apt to attach blame to a small
child or to identify with a parent who has evidenced aberrant behavior. 77 Moreover, proving neglect under these circumstances presents minimal difficulty.
However, when older children are involved, judges and other
court personnel are more likely to favor PINS proceedings. One
possible explanation for this preference is that the individuals who
comprise juvenile court systems tend to identify with a parent who has
charged a teen-ager with misbehavior, since these individuals may
also be struggling with adolescent rebelliousness in their own families.
Another factor is the comparative difficulty of proving parental neglect of older adolescents, which is often more subtle and passive than
neglect of younger children. 78 If the parents secure attorneys who
vigorously defend against the neglect charges, the proceedings will
certainly be protracted, and the petition may eventually be dismissed.
Juvenile court personnel will thus prefer PINS proceedings, which in
all likelihood will be speedily concluded by admissions of "guilt"
from the children. 79 As an additional incentive, the PINS finding
76. Studies of juvenile cases at the trial level confirm that the foregoing appellate
decisions, notes 64-75 supra and accompanying text, involving the adjudication of
neglected children as PINS are not isolated instances or aberrations. See THE PINS
CHILD, A PLETIIORA OF PROBLEMS, supra note 27, at 30-31, 33-36 (pointing out that
a majority of children alleged to be PINS had inadequate or neglectful parents);
YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1392 n.67 (concluding that 50 per cent of the
PINS children considered in the study were in fact neglected); E. WAKIN, supra note
29, at 12-13, 69 (34-state study by the National Council of Jewish Women produced
examples such as the following: a 15-year-old girl kept in detention because her
father was charged with raping her; a 14-year-old boy brought to court by mentally
disturbed parents for failure to take a bath).
77. See, e.g., In re Fred S., 66 Misc. 2d 683, 322 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Fam. Ct. 1971)
(involving serious physical injuries to infants).
78. Cf. State v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407, 413, 464 P.2d 395, 399 (1970) ("Since
the species of • . . [the mother's] neglect involved rather subtle psychological factors
-interference with the adequate social, educational, and psychological adjustment of
her children-justice requires that she be informed of the condition and be advised
of appropriate remedial action. There was not a scintilla of evidence that the home
itself 'cannot or will not correct the evils which exist'") (footnote omitted).
79. See YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1393; cf. In re Mario, 65 Misc. 2d
708, 317 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Fam. Ct. 1971), involving the placement of a PINS child
in the state training school. The court acknowledged generalized passive neglect on
the mother's part. A neglect petition originally filed at the judge's direction was subsequently withdrawn because the mother was participating in counseling services.
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may permit placement in the state training schools if private facilities
are unavailable. 80
Another misuse of the PINS jurisdiction, which may also stem
from a desire to increase placement options, is created by statutes that
define delinquency to include the violation of probation or any other
court order by a PINS child. 81 In one case, a fifteen-year-old Illinois
girl was declared a PINS for "frequently absenting herself from home"
and placed on probation. After she breached probation rules by
playing truant, she was adjudicated a delinquent pursuant to a statute
that forbade violation of "a lawful court [probation] order," and was
committed to the state training school. 82 Other courts have reached
similar results. 83 In contrast, a Colorado court construed a delinquency statute that forbade violation of a "lawful order of court" so
as not to include violation of a term of probation by a PINS child.
The court asserted that "it would be contrary to the obvious legislative
intent to allow a child to be committed to an institution for juvenile
delinquents where the only acts alleged were those which were not, in
and of themselves, grounds for an adjudication of delinquency ...." 84
A similar statutory mechanism for adjudicating PINS children as
delinquents on the basis of noncriminal behavior is to charge the child
80. See notes 281-83 infra and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & JNSTNS. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1976); GA. CoDn
ANN. § 24A-40l(e)(2) (Supp. 1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1203(12)(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1975).
82. In re Sekeres, 48 Ill. 2d 431, 270 N.E.2d 7 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1008 (1972). See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972). The Illinois
statute has since been amended so as to preclude such a result. See ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3(d) (Smith-Hurd 1972).
83. See, e.g., Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Presley, 47
Ill. 2d 50, 264 N.E.2d 177 (1970); In re Dowell, 17 N.C. App. 134, 193 S.E.2d 302
(1972). See also In re William S., 10 Cal. App. 3d 944, 89 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1970)
(PINS child's threat to violate court order held insufficient to constitute delinquency).
84. In re D.R., 29 Colo. App. 525, - , 487 P.2d 824, 826 (1971). See In re
Denise C., 45 Cal. App. 3d 761, 119 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1975) (per curiam) (holding
that an adjudicated PINS cannot be made a delinquent and committed to the state
training school on the basis of running away from a placement facility, unless the
order of placement specifically directs the child not to do so, and unless there is a
determination that the previous disposition completely failed to rehabilitate the
child); In re A.L.H., 517 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (construing a statutory
provision so as to prohibit training school placement of a PINS child who had violated probation by further PINS conduct). The Texas Family Code has since been
amended in a manner that permits training school placement of runaway and truant
PINS who violate probation orders, provided such facilities do not also house delinquents. See Tux. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.03(a)(2), 51.03(b)(4), (Supp. 1975),
Tux. CIV. STAT. art. 5143d, § 12(b) (Supp. 1975), amending TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.03 (1975). A similar result was achieved in New York by a process of judicial and administrative action. Compare In re Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d
424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973), with In re Lavette M., 35 N.Y.2d 136, 316 N.E.2d
314, 359 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1974), discussed in note 134 infra.
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who runs away from a state PINS facility with the "crime" of escape.
Courts upholding such delinquency adjudications reason that custody
is essential for a child's treatment and rehabilitation and that this
technique prevents children from flouting the judicial process. 85
The results reached in these cases presuppose that a troubled,
runaway child who is placed in a nonsecure PINS facility will not flee
again, or that, in doing so, he or she realizes "the effect that flight
will have on the exercise of judicial authority."86 Besides reflecting
unrealistic expectations of child behavior, these statutes and decisions
also appear to rest on the theory that the only way to deal effectively
with children who repeatedly misbehave is to use force and secure
detention. 87
A third significant abuse of the PINS jurisdiction is its utilization
85. In re M.S., 129 N.J. Super. 61, 322 A.2d 202 (Essex County Ct. 1974), atfd.,
139 NJ. Super. 503, 354 A.2d 646 (1976); see L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alas.
1976) (Applying variant of the "crime" of escape theory, court held PINS child in
contempt and adjudicated her a delinquent on basis of her having repeatedly run
away from a nonsecure facility in violation of court order). Cf. State v. Williams, 301 S.2d 327, 328 (La. 1974) (holding that juvenile who fled from state
training school could not be prosecuted as an adult for the crime of escape since
juvenile's commitment is not tantamount to imprisonment and commitment not a sentence); but see Le Vier v. State, 214 Kan. 287, 520 P.2d 1325 (1974) (affirming
habitual offender sentence where one of the underlying felonies was defendant's escape from the state training school when he was 15 years old; by statute, the legislature had classified such escapes as felonies and as not within the juvenile court's jurisdiction).
86. In re M.S., 129 N.J. Super. 61, 69, 322 A.2d 202, 206 (Essex County Ct.
1914), affd., 139 N.J. Super. 503, 354 A.2d 646 (1976). The court in the M.S. case
reached this result even though the New Jersey statute defining delinquency did
not include violation of a court order. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 4-44 (Cum.
Supp. 1975). By treating departure from a juvenile facility as the crime of escape,
the court in effect overruled the legislature's determination that disobedience of
a court order (in this case an order remanding the child to a shelter) did not
constitute delinquency. In coming to this conclusion, the New Jersey court mistakenly relied on Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972), which dealt
with the Illinois juvenile statute that, unlike New Jersey's statute, specifically included
violation of a lawful court order within the definition of delinquency. 129 N.J.
Super. at 75, 322 A.2d at 210 (1974).
87. See bz re M.S., 129 N.J. Super. 61, 74, 322 A.2d 202, 209, 210 (Essex County
Ct. 1974), atfd., 139 N.J. Super. 503, 354 A.2d 646 (197<i). Cf. A Minor Boy v.
State, 89 Nev. 564, 566, 517 P.2d 183, 185 (1973) (juvenile arrested for drinking
beer, taken to county jail where he was forcibly held down while his long
hair was cut; when put in a cell, he destroyed furnishing, for which he was
adjudicated a delinquent and placed at training school; appellate court reversed,
stating that destruction of furnishing "flowed from [state's] failure to observe
the requirements of law"); Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.) (threejudge court), affd. mem., 423 U.S. 907 (1975) (upholding state statute permitting corporal punishment of school children without parental consent, provided that
it is not used initially to punish misbehavior and that the child is placed on notice
as to conduct which will warrant whipping); N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1975, at 25, col.
1 (late city ed.) (describing recently discontinued practice in Butte, Montana schools
of locking retarded children in a coffin-sized box as punishment for violence).
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as a substitute for a charge of delinquency where the alleged criminal
act cannot be proved. In cases where there is insufficient proof of
drug-related crimes, 88 receipt of stolen goods, 89 vehicular homicide, 00
reckless driving, 91 assault, 92 burglary,93 criminal mischief, 94 or sex
offenses,95 trial courts have instead made PINS findings. 00 Perhaps
88. See, e.g., In re William S., 10 Cal. App. 3d 944, 949, 89 Cal. Rptr. 685, 68889 (1970) (affirming PINS adjudication even though there was a failure of proof
with respect to one of the underlying charges that was criminal in nature; child's
presence in a home where marijuana was found was sufficient proof of his bad associations); In re Daniel R., 274 Cal. App. 2d 749, 753 n.3, 79 Cal. Rptr. 247, 250
n.3 (1969) (reversing on ground of insufficient corroboration PINS finding based on
allegation that child admitted selling marijuana, but suggesting that "[t]he evidence
would support findings that the minor had in his possession a substantial sum of
money . • . and that he associated with persons engaged in the narcotics traffic,
which latter fact, not being an act defined as a felony, might be shown by his admissions"); In re Dudley, 310 S.2d 919, 920 (Miss. 1975) (dictum) (in reversing delinquency adjudication on other grounds, court observed that, although "being under the
influence" of marijuana was not a crime under Mississippi law, "such conduct, when
properly alleged and upon adequate proof," might afford a basis for a PINS adjudication). See cases discussed in note 215 infra, in which PINS findings were affirmed,
even though there was insufficient evidence to prove possession of narcotics or narcotics paraphernalia, or there was no criminal statute prohibiting use of particular
drug.
89. See, e.g., In re Simon, 295 S.2d 473, 477 (La. App. 1974) (trial court dismissed delinquency petition on the basis of determination that child did not know
property in question was stolen, but proceeded to make PINS finding, which was reversed on appeal).
90. See, e.g., In re Williams, 241 Ore. 207, 405 P.2d 371 (1965) (trial court dismissed delinquency charge based on vehicular homicide because there was no evidence of recklessness, as required by state statute, but made PINS finding based on
negligence, which appellate court reversed).
91. See, e.g., In re Dahlberg, 184 Neb. 303, 167 N.W.2d 190 (1969) (affirming
PINS finding that child deported himself so as to injure or endanger others, on the
basis of evidence of malicious damage to a car and of assault).
92. See, e.g., In re Mark V., 34 App. Div. 2d 1101, 312 N.Y.S.2d 983 (4th Dept.
1970) (per curiam) (reversing PINS adjudication because there was only an isolated
incident of misconduct and the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of delinquency based on a simple assault).
93. See, e.g., In re Raymond 0., 31 N.Y.2d 730, 290 N.E.2d 145, 338 N.Y.S.2d
105 (1972) (per curiam) (reversing a PINS adjudication based on a single act of
criminal trespass, where the trial court had dismissed a delinquency petition alleging
burglazy. The appellate court stated that it would have been permissible for the trial
judge to find respondent guilty of a lesser included offense of burglazy, but that dismissal of the petition without such a finding deprived the court of jurisdiction).
94. Cf. In re Helman, 230 Pa. Super. 484, 327 A.2d 163 (1974) (children
charged with criminal mischief and adjudicated delinquents based on smoking cigars
at scene of fire; reversed on the ground that evidence showed that they were at most
guilty of criminal trespass, which was a summazy offense and not a crime).
95. See In re Gladys R.., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 865-66, 464 P.2d 127, 135-36, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 671, 679-80 (1970) (dictum) (reversing delinquency adjudication against 12year-old girl for child molesting because, inter alia, the trial court failed to consider
whether she appreciated the wrongfulness of her act; court suggested, however, that,
if there was no such proof, a PINS finding would nonetheless be appropriate); accord, In re Michael B., 44 Cal. App. 3d 445, 118 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1975); cf. Sorrels
v. Steele, 506 P.2d 942, 943-44 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
96. See THE PflllS Cmu>, A PLETIIORA OF PROBLEMS, supra note 27, at 45-47
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the most startling example of this abuse of the PINS jurisdiction
involved two girls, ages eleven and thirteen, who had allegedly engaged in sexual activities and drug abuse with adult men and women. 97 The adults were arrested and charged with statutory rape and
sexual perversion, and the children were identified by the police as
victims. Subsequently, the girls were charged not only as delinquents, but also as PINS. The evidence introduced at the adjudicatory
hearing in the juvenile court included statements that the girls gave
to the police in connection with the investigation of the adults and the
testimony of one 'Of the girls, who, over her attorney's objection, had
been called by the prosecutor at her own hearing. The trial judge
made PINS findings against the children and placed them in the
custody of the Department of Juvenile Services. 98 With one judge
dissenting, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the decision
and held, on the basis of a strained interpretation of In re Gault, 99
that because this was a PINS proceeding in which the children were
(finding that 16 per cent of the PINS children sampled allegedly used drugs and over
one third were alleged to have stolen or to have committed assault); YALE PINS
SnmY, supra note 33, at 1393-94 n.78, n.81 (indicating that 15-20 per cent of the
PINS cases studied alleged criminal behavior and that such cases were processed as
PINS to avoid burden of proof and evidentiary standards applicable in delinquency
actions).
Indeed, in one case, even though the legislature had mandated that the crime of
statutory rape could be committed only by a person over 18, the court found that,
while a 16-year-old juvenile could not be adjudicated delinquent on the basis of consensual intercourse with a 15-year-old girl, he came within the statutory definition
of "an unruly boy." In re J.P., 32 Ohio Misc. 5, 287 N.E.2d 926, 61 Ohio Op. 2d
24 (1972); accord, In re M.K., 493 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. App. 1973). In another action,
the court made a PINS adjudication that a 14-year-old boy was" 'in danger of leading
an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life' by reason of the fact that he had committed . . . manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon." In re Donnie H., 5 Cal.
App. 3d 781, 791, 85 Cal. Rptr. 359, 365 (1970). This finding was entered after
the juvenile court had dismissed a delinquency petition based on the same charges
because the only supporting evidence was an illegally obtained confession. The appellate court reversed the PINS finding. 5 Cal. App. 3d at 788-91, 85 Cal. Rptr. at
364-65.
Section 601 of the California Code was amended effective Sept. 30, 1975, to
eliminate juvenile court jurisdiction over minors who are "in danger of leading an
idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life." See CAL. WELF. & INsTNs. CODE§ 601 (West
Supp. 1976), amending CAL. WELF. & INSTNs. CODE § 601 (West 1972). While the
statutory deletion would preclude a court from making a PINS adjudication similar
to that of In re Donnie H., amended section 601(a) retains the "beyond control of
the parent" provision. Accordingly, the prosecutor could argue that any child who
commits manslaughter, or any other criminal act, is beyond the control of his or her
parent or guardian.
97. In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975).
98. One of the girls was released after an intermediate appellate decision, and
thus did not appeal to the state's highest court In re Carter, 20 Md. App. 633, 318
A.2d 269 (1974).
99. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The case is discussed in notes 117 and 118 infra and
accompanying text.
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not charged with criminal acts, the privilege against self-incrimination
was inapplicable.100
Use of the PINS jurisdiction in this manner is a device101 for
stripping the child of constitutional rights guaranteed to delinquents
under the Gault decision. 102 It permits a PINS finding to be used as
a "lesser included offense" of juvenile delinquency when there is a
failure of proof in the underlying criminal charges. 103 The effect is
to circumvent the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in delinquency cases,104 because some states permit a
lesser standard of proof in PINS cases,105 and because minimal
evidence of misbehavior can often satisfy vague PINS definitional
statutes. If the child is in fact innocent of the underlying criminal
charges, but is nonetheless adjudicated a PINS on the basis of the
same allegations, the juvenile is punished for something he or she did
not do. 106 If, on the other hand, the juvenile is guilty of a crime, a
PINS finding may result in placement of this child with PINS children
who have never committed criminal acts. 107
100. The court's opinion makes it clear that the acts charged could have supported a delinquency adjudication; the court noted, however, that, since the appellant
"was, in fact, a victim, the charge of delinquency in the petition must be regarded
as simply an unexplained anomaly." 273 Md. at 708, 332 A.2d at 256. The court
went on to observe that, ''with the elimination of the delinquency 'charge' • . . the
claims of alleged 'criminal' conduct, on which it was premised, vanished with it."
273 Md. at 709, 332 A.2d at 256-57. The dissenting judge pointed out that, "since
criminal acts may be the basis for 'CINS' proceedings, and since an adjudication that
a child is in need of supervision may lead to confinement in an institution for as
long a period as an adjudication that he is delinquent, virtually all juvenile proceedings could be labelled 'CINS' by the authorities without significant consequences.
Thus by using the right labels, i.e., 'victim' and 'CINS', the police and juvenile authorities will be able to bypass the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court
in Gault." 273 Md. at 716, 332 A.2d at 260.
101. The device is rationalized in terms of the "best interests" doctrine. See note
151 infra and accompanying text.
102. See In re Donnie H., 5 Cal. App. 3d 781, 790, 85 Cal. Rptr. 359, 364-65
(1970); In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 716, 332 A.2d 246, 259-60 (1975) (dissenting
opinion). In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19-29 (1967), and In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 366-68 (1970), the Supreme Court rejected the "best interests" doctrine as a
basis for denying fundamental constitutional rights, in adjudicatory hearings, to juveniles accused of delinquent acts.
103. See In re Simon, 295 S.2d 473, 481 (La. App. 1974) (dissenting opinion).
104. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366-68 (1970).
105. See note 122 infra and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., In re Donnie H., 5 Cal. App. 3d 781, 85 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1970)
(serious question as to whether death was brought about by the accused child or by
the victim's parents); In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952)
(unclear whether respondent was one of the eight or nine boys who assaulted the
victim).
101. See notes 274-83 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the appropriateness of commingling PINS children with neglected children as contrasted with
the appropriateness of commingling those juveniles guilty of criminal offenses with
PINS children.
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Commingling of PINS and delinquent children also results from
delinquency findings based merely on noncriminal violations of a
court order or on escapes from PINS facilities. A legislative or
judicial conclusion that such mixing is harmful to the PINS children
is effectively thwarted by the use of legal fictions, however benevolent
their purpose, to interchange PINS and delinquents. 108
Another abuse is the frequent invocation of the PINS jurisdiction
to punish trivial misconduct. 109 At best, these cases are a waste of
the court's time and resources. At worst, the prosecution of some of
these cases appears to have been racially motivated. 110 Even where
the alleged misbehavior is not trivial, the court has been used to
enforce parental moral codes; in one such instance a mother sought to
compel her daughter to consent to an abortion. 111 Other parents
utilize the PINS jurisdiction as a means of divesting themselves of the
responsibility of caring for their children. 112
Perhaps the most alarming characteristic of the PINS jurisdiction
is its disproportionate application to the children of the poor,113 the
108. Cf. In re Jeanette P., 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 310 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (2d Dept.
1970) (per curiam) ("The creation of the additional [PINS] designation . . . represents enlightened legislative recognition of the difference between youngsters who
commit criminal acts and those who merely misbehave. . . . However, the distinction becomes useless where, as here, the treatment accorded the one must be identical
to that accorded the other solely because no other adequate alternative has been provided").
109. See text at notes 220-23 infra, discussing the de minimis defense. Cf. People v. Allen, 22 N.Y.2d 465, 470, 239 N.E.2d 879, 881, 293 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282
(1968) (in construing a "Wayward Minor" criminal statute, court notes that "particular care should be taken that the charge has substance based on acts which point
to grave danger to youth and is not merely a compliance with form; and that the
conduct inquired into is seriously harmful and not merely an exaggerated manifestation of intra-family parent-child conflict").
110. See M.S.K. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 1, 205 S.E.2d 59 (1974); Young v. State,
120 Ga. App. 605, 171 S.E.2d 756 (1969); In re McMillan, 21 N.C. App. 712, 205
S.E.2d 541 (1974); see also In re Green, 203 S.2d 470 (Miss. 1967), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 945 (1968); In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), affd. sub
nom. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (prosecution of Black children
based on participation in civil rights demonstration).
111. See In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972) (per curiam) (affirming PINS finding and reversing order compelling abortion). See also In re
M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974) (reversing juvenile court order authorizing sterilization of mentally retarded girl); cf. Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371, 375 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (three-judge court), affd. mem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972) (holding New
York's "Wayward Minor" criminal statute unconstitutional; one of the plaintiffs was
prosecuted after refusing to permit her out-of-wedlock child to be adopted and another was proceeded against for defying her social worker's instruction to remain in
a foster home).
112. See, e.g., In re Presley, 47 Ill. 2d 50, 52, 57, 264 N.E.2d 177, 178, 180
(1970).
113. See Thomas & Fitch, An Inquiry into_ the Association Between Respondent~
Personal Characteristics and Juvenile Court Disposition, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv.
61, 77, 78, 83 (1975), in which the authors generally conclude, on the basis of a
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economic class least able to effectuate improvements in the quality of
juvenile court services and treatment facilities. Due to the accessibility of alternative options for treatment, such as private schools or
private psychiatric care, the affluent parent of a misbehaving child
will not likely seek the services of the juvenile court. Any child from
a wealthy family brought to court by a third party (i.e., the police or
school officials) will probably be screened out by the intake adjustment procedure because of the available parental resources. If the
case is not diverted from the judicial process at this stage, affluent
parents can offer treatment alternatives far superior to those of the
state and thus obtain a favorable judicial disposition. 114
Because parents are the primary enforcers in PINS cases, and because most PINS statutes describe the condemned conduct in vague
terms relating to loss of parental control, a disparate group of individuals has been vested with awesome prosecutorial discretion. 110
Thus, whether a child will be brought to court depends less upon his
statistical analysis of 1522 Virginia cases, that the harshest juvenile court sanctions
are applied to Blacks, school dropouts, children from broken homes, status offenders
brought to court by their parents, and juveniles from low socioeconomic backgrounds.
114. For an interesting description of how wealthy parents can, by effective trial
and appellate litigation, prevent their child's institutionalization, see In re J.F., 17
Ohio Misc. 40, 242 N.E.2d 604, 46 Ohio Op. 2d 49 (1968). As a result of protracted
appeals, the child, who was found guilty of arson, outgrew the court's jurisdiction,
having spent a total of one hour in detention during the interim.
115. In E.A.S. v. State, 291 S.2d 61 (Fla. App. 1974), the mother of a 15-yearold girl called the police because her child refused to come out of the closet, When
the girl declined to leave the closet to talk to two police officers, they dragged her
out and, as a result, she allegedly kicked and scratched them. She was charged with
resisting arrest and was adjudicated a delinquent. On appeal, with one dissent and
one special concurrence, the adjudication was reversed on the grounds that there was
no justification for the arrest and that in fact no arrest had been made.
This case illustrates the ease with which the PINS jurisdiction can be abused, for
it enabled the mother to summon the police to intervene in what was at most a family
squabble. As the concurring judge stated, "I feel that •.. [the police] properly responded to the call by the child's mother and that they were within the bonds [sic]
of their duties and responsibilities in attempting to induce the child to leave the closet
and her room." 291 S.2d at 63. The girl spent almost one year in a juvenile detention center pending appeal. 291 S.2d at 63, Cf. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp.
1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (three-judge district court), prob. juris. noted, 44 U.S.L.W.
3531 (U.S. March 22, 1976) (No. 75-1064), in which the descriptions of children
"voluntarily" committed by their parents to mental institutions bear a striking resemblance to many PINS children in juvenile court. Examples include commitment of
a child who "interfered with the routine of the household and disturbed family members" and commitment to prevent breakup of the parents' marriage. "Class members
have also been committed to mental hospitals for running away, robbing a gas station,
stealing in general, chasing and striking a girl, arson, delinquent behavior in general, truancy •..." 402 F. Supp. at 1044. See also J.L. v. Parham, 44 U.S.L.W.
2421, 2422 (M.D. Ga., Feb. 26, 1976) (three-judge district court) (the court noted
that, "Unfortunately, the evidence indicates that there are some parents who .••
look upon mental hospitals as a 'dumping ground.' ")
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or her conduct than upon the fortuitous circumstance of parental
tolerance and maturity. 116
ill.

CHALLENGES TO THE

PINS

JURISDICTION

In view of the abuses that derive from the vagueness of many
PINS statutes and from the extensive discretion granted to parents
and courts, it is not surprising that a variety of attacks have been
lodged against the PINS jursidiction.
Although Supreme Court decisions during the past decade have
established significant due process safeguards for allegedly delinquent
children, that tribunal has not yet determined whether PINS have
similar rights. In re Gault, 117 decided in 1967, held that, during the
adjudicatory phase of the proceedings, a youth who was charged with
"delinquency" and subject to commitment to a state institution was
entitled to notice of the charges, and was possessed of the right to
counsel, the right to confrontation and cross-examination, and the
privilege against self-incrimination.11 8 Three years later, in In re
116. Rena Uviller, presently Director of the Juvenile Rights Division of the
American Civil Liberties Union and previously a trial and appellate attorney for the
Juvenile Rights Division of the New York City Legal Aid Society, has observed that
PINS children placed in the state training school remain incarcerated for much longer
periods than delinquents who commit serious crimes, because many parents of PINS
children oppose their return to the home. Ms. Uviller advocates abolition of the
PINS jurisdiction and the use of a graduated sentencing system for delinquents that
reflects the gravity of the crime. See Letter to the N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1975, §
6 (Magazine), at 22, col. 1 (late city ed.). See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1975, at
1, col. I (late city ed.), describing a 15-year-old boy adjudicated delinquent for the
murder (beating with a golf club) of a young girl; he was committed to a minimum
security rehabilitation center for 18 months, but officials said that in all likelihood,
he "will serve only six to eight months." The article noted that the boy had no prior
criminal record and "lived with parents who cared about him." Id. Compare Lollis
v. New York State Dept. of Social Services, 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), in
which a 14-year-old PINS girl was committed to the state training school, released
to her mother after ten months, and within two months, was recommitted on her
mother's complaint. A few days later, the girl was implicated in a fight and confined
for two weeks in an isolation "strip" room. The child's mother was subsequently
charged with neglect of the girl's seven siblings.
·
117. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
118. Despite the far-reaching nature of its opinion, the Court did limit the applicability of its holding: "We consider only the problems presented to us by this case.
These relate to the proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a
juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to a state institution." 387 U.S. at 13. Some
courts have seized upon this language to support rulings that Gault is inapplicable
to PINS proceedings, since the latter do not involve criminal law violations. See,
e.g., State v. Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 1972); In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690,
332 A.2d 246 (1975). Such reliance seems misplaced, however, because: (1) although Gerald Gault was adjudicated a "delinquent" on the basis of his having made
obscene telephone calls, at the time he was tried, the Arizona Juvenile Code defined
a delinquent child to include not only one who committed a criminal-law violation,
but also one who habitually deported himself so as to endanger his morals or health,
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Winship, 119 the Court held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was
constitutionally required to establish guilt in the adjudicatory stage of
delinquency actions, but it specifically deferred decision as to whether
that requirement was applicable in PINS cases. 120 Although persuasive arguments can be made in favor of the extension of these rights
to PINS proceedings, at least in those jurisdictions in which PINS
may be committed to state institutions, 121 there are conflicts among
the state court decisions on this question. 122
see 387 U.S. at 9 n.6; (2) the Arizona juvenile court judge found Gault guilty under
both sections of the above statute, a fact specifically noted by the Supreme Court,
387 U.S. at 8 n.5, 9, 34 n.54; (3) the Gault court was aware of the few recently
enacted state laws establishing separate classifications for status offenders and knew
that many "delinquents" were committed to state institutions for waywardness, 387
U.S. at 24 n.31, 27; and (4) as in the case of Gerald Gault, many PINS actions
involve conduct which is also criminal, see, e.g., In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 332
A.2d 246 (1975). Moreover, in Gault, when the Court wished to make its decision
applicable only to the adjudicatory phase of juvenile proceedings, it did so by specifically excluding the pre- and post-adjudicatory phases. 387 U.S. at 13, 31 n.48.
Finally, the Court's awareness of the distinction between PINS and delinquency proceedings is illustrated by its decision in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), in which
PINS cases were explicitly excluded from the holding. See notes 119-20 infra and
accompanying text. This exclusion might be considered gratuitous, inasmuch as the
New York statute involved established separate PINS and delinquency categories, and
Samuel Winship was charged only with delinquency, i.e. the criminal act of larceny.
397 U.S. at 359-60; see N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr §§ 712(a), (b) (McKinney 1963),
as amended, N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr §§ 712(a), (b) (McKinney 1975).
However, an additional basis for doubting the applicability of Gault to PINS cases
may have been created by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Middendorf v.
Henry, 44 U.S.L.W. 4401 (U.S. March 24, 1976) (Nos. 74-175, 74-5176), which
held that there is no constitutional right to counsel in summary courts-martial. The
Court cited Gault and emphasized the noncriminal nature of the charges against the
servicemen, stating that "most of the plaintiffs were charged solely with 'unauthorized
absence,' an offense which has no common-law counterpart and which carries little
popular opprobrium." 44 U.S.L.W. at 4405. The case is distinguishable though,
since the maximum punishment in a summary courtmartial proceeding is much shorter
than the usual maximum sanctions applicable in PINS cases.
119. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
120. 397 U.S. at 359 n.1. In re Ivan V., 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (per curiam)
held that Winship was completely retroactive. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971), the Court determined that there was no right to trial by jury in the adjudicatory stage of juvenile delinquency proceedings. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519
(1975), the Court's most recent decision in the juvenile area, held that the double
jeopardy clause applied to delinquency proceedings in juvenile court and prohibited
retrial of an adjudicated delinquent in adult criminal court for the same underlying
act. The Supreme Court has agreed to review the decision of a three-judge district
court in Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), that held unconstitutional state statutory provisions authorizing "voluntary" commitment of children to
mental hospitals upon parental application, on the ground that due process safeguards
were inadequate. Kremens v. Bartley, 44 U.S.L.W. 3531 (U.S. March 22, 1976) (No.
75-1064).
121. See note 118 supra. The possibility of confinement was one of the reasons
given by the Court for its decisions in both Gault and Winship. See In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 367, 368 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 27 (1967).
122. For courts that have declined to apply Gault and Winship in PINS cases,
see State v. Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 1972) (in which a majority of the
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In contrast to efforts to assure fundamental fairness in delinquency
proceedings by means of procedural due process challenges, there
have also been broad, frontal attacks on the very power of the state to
assert jurisdiction over children on the basis of noncriminal status
offenses. Specifically, litigants have argued: (1) that PINS legislation imposes sanctions on the basis of a status rather than any specific
acts and thus constitutes cruel and unusual punishment;123 (2) that
court appears to hold that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is inapplicable in PINS proceedings, but in which the court appears evenly divided as to the
applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination in PINS cases); In re Potter,
237 N.W.2d 461 (Iowa 1976) (reasonable doubt standard inapplicable in PINS proceedings); In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975) (holding fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable to PINS proceedings); In re
Walker, 282 N.C. 28, 191 S.E.2d 702 (1972) (right to counsel does not apply unless,
at the time of the PINS adjudication, incarceration in a state institution is a possible
disposition, even though a subsequent violation of the probation order issued pursuant
to that original adjudication could, and in fact did, lead to commitment to a state facility). See also In re Donnie H., 5 Cal. App. 3d 781, 85 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1970) (holding that an illegally obtained confession of manslaughter which could not be used in a
delinquency proceeding was also inadmissible in a PINS proceeding based on the same
underlying criminal charge, but declining to rule on whether an illegally obtained confession of a status offense would be admissible in a PINS proceeding); Warner v.
State, 254 Ind. 209, 214, 258 N.E.2d 860, 863-64 (1970) (dictum) (reasonable doubt
standard inapplicable in PINS cases); In re Dahlberg, 184 Neb. 303, 167 N.W.2d 190
(1969) (pre-Winship decision declining to determine appropriate standard of proof in
PINS case because, on de novo review, court found there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Geiger, 184 Neb. 581, 169 N.W.2d 431 (1969) (on de novo review,
divided court found there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt and thus no necessity
to determine appropriate standard of proof).
In contrast, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held that PINS
children have the right to counsel. See State ex rel. Wilson v. Bambrick, 195 S.E.2d
721 (W. Va. 1973). The New York courts have held that the reasonable doubt
standard applies in PINS cases. See, e.g., In re Iris R., 3J N.Y.2d 987, 309 N.E.2d
140, 353 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1974) (per curiam); In re Richard S., 27 N.Y.2d 802, 264
N.E.2d 353, 315 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1970).
Some statutes require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in PINS cases. See, e.g.,
CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1-103(1), 104(1)(b) (1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
119, § 39(b) (1975); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.17, 54.03(f) (1975). But see,
e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2317(c)(2) (Supp. 1973) (preponderance standard of
proof); MD. Crs. & Jun. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-819(d) (Supp. 1975) (preponderance
standard of proof); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-229(c) (Cum. Supp. 1974) (clear and
convincing standard of proof).
Some authorities doubt the value of a stricter standard of proof where PINS statutes include vague proscriptions, such as leading an immoral or dissolute life, because
virtually any evidence will arguably be sufficient to sustain the burden. See Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), at 11-12, vacated, 416 U.S.
918 (1974); Note, Parens Patriae and Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82
YALE L.J. 745, 756 n.71 (1973).
Many states have held the double jeopardy clause applicable in delinquency proceedings. See cases cited in District of Columbia v. I.P., 335 A.2d 224, 228 n.7
(D.C. App. 1975). The court in the J.P. case stated, however, "We express no opinion on the applicability of the double jeopardy clause to other juvenile adjudications
such as 'child in need of supervision' or 'neglected child' cases." 335 A.2d at 229
n.9.
123. See Blondheim v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 874, 880, 529 P.2d 1096, 1101 (1975)
(eighth amendment argument rejected); Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550,
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PINS statutes deprive children of liberty without due process, since
there is no evidence that PINS children will subsequently commit
criminal acts (thus placing their conduct beyond the state's police
power) or that the welfare of PINS children is being promoted by the
state's rehabilitative efforts in its capacity as parens patriae; 124 and
(3) that, in sanctioning children for acts that would not be penalized
if committed by an adult, the PINS statutes violate equal protec•
tion. 125 These arguments have been almost uniformly rejected by the
courts.120

Due process challenges against PINS statutes have also been
based on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. One argument is
that amorphous prohibitions such as those against incorrigibility or
leading an idle or dissolute life fail to give notice of the proscribed
conduct. Another objection is that these statutes constitute an impro•
per delegation of legislative authority to private parties and public
officials, who are given virtually unlimited discretion to determine
which children will be brought to court and what types of misbehav•
ior will form the basis for PINS charges; moreover, the breadth of the
- , 270 N.E.2d 389, 394-95 (1971) (argument that "stubbornness in a child 'may
be symptomatic of a psychological defect'" rejected); cf. Mercado v. Rockefeller, 363
F. Supp. 489,492 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), revd. in part, 502 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied sub nom. Mercado v. Carey, 420 U.S. 925 (1975) (district court dismissed
complaint for failure to exhaust state remedies, and thus did not pass on plaintiff's
eighth amendment argument; appeal to Second Circuit did not contest trial court's
exhaustion ruling with respect to this claim; court of appeals decision discussed i11
note 130 infra); Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (threejudge district court), affd. mem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972) (holding unconstitutional New
York "Wayward Minor" statute, which was part of the state's criminal statutory
scheme rather than its juvenile law). See also R.R. v. State, 448 S.W.2d 187, 190
(Tex. Civ. App. 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. Rios v. Texas, 400 U.S. 808
(1970) (holding that commitment of delinquent to training school for a period longer
than the maximum for adults who committed the same criminal act did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment).
124. See, e.g., S.S. v. State, 299 A.2d 560, 568 (Me. 1973); Commonwealth v.
Brasher, 359 Mass. 550,-, 270 N.E.2d 389, 393-94 (1971); In re Morin, 95 N.H.
518, 520, 68 A.2d 668, 670 (1949) (rejecting arguments that PINS statutes exceeded
the state's police power or its power as parens patriae).
125. See S.S. v. State, 299 A.2d 560, 510 (Me. 1973) (rejecting equal protection
argument). Cf. Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235, 1238-39 (7th Cir. 1972); People
v. Sekeres, 48 Ill. 2d 431, 435, 270 N.E.2d 7, 9 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1008
(1972) (no equal protection violation where state adjudicates as delinquents PINS
who have disobeyed court orders). See also Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1969) (commitment of delinquent to training school for a period longer
than the maximum for adults committing the same criminal act did not violate equal
protection).
126. See cases cited in notes 123-25 supra. See also, Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart.
9 (Pa. 1838). But see People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 8 Am. R. 645
(1870). For an historical discussion of the juvenile court movement in the United
States and early case law, see Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspec•
tive, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970).
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statutory definitions may authorize intrusion upon constitutionally
protected behavior.127 Vagueness also permits arbitrary application
of the statute by trial judges, with little opportunity for effective
appellate review. Still, although a few courts have accepted such
arguments and have struck down portions of PINS statutes,128 most
have rejected challenges based on vagueness and overbreadth,129 and
127. See, e.g., Note, supra note 122, at 746-48; Note, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
over "Immoral" Youth in California, 24 STAN. L. REV. 568, 580-81 (1972). See
generally Todd, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal Courts, 26 STAN. L. REV. 855,
857-58 (1974). Professor Todd's observation that vague statutory proscriptions can
effectively undercut procedural due process guarantees seems particularly applicable
to PINS cases. For example, if a child is accused of leading an immoral life, the
right to notice of the "charges," as a means of preparing a proper defense, is of questionable value, since the finder of fact has virtually unfettered discretion to determine
what conduct constitutes violation of the statute. This statutory vagueness may account in part for the overwhelming number of PINS admissions of guilt even in jurisdictions granting PINS the same procedural due process rights as delinquents. See
note 160 infra and accompanying text.
It is difficult for appellate courts to limit the applicability of vague PINS statutes
by reversals in individual cases, because the variety of misbehavior arguably falling
within the scope of the statute is almost infinite. Indeed, in Gesicki v. Oswald, 336
F. Supp. 371, (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (three-judge court), affd. mem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972),
which held New York's criminal "Wayward Minor" statute unconstitutionally vague,
the court specifically noted that, since state court reversals "illustrate only a scant
number of instances in which the [state] Court of Appeals believed the facts established the juveniles were not included in the universe of 'morally depraved' children,
they do not appreciably diminish the vagueness of the class of remaining cases that
are included." (emphasis in original). 336 F. Supp. at 374 n.4.
128. See Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971) (three-judge
court), vacated, 416 U.S. 918 (1974); In re Brinkley, No. J. 1365-73 (D.C. Super.
Ct., June 14, 1973), revd. sub nom. District of Columbia v. B.J.R., 332 A.2d 58
(D.C. App.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975); In re Doe, 54 Hawaii 647, 513
P.2d 1385 (1973) (curfew ordinance invalidated). Cf. State v. Hodges, 254 Ore. 21,
457 P.2d 491 (1969) (criminal statutory-prohibition against contributing to the delinquency of a minor unconstitutionally vague as an improper delegation of legislative
authority); In re Oman, 254 Ore. 59, 457 P.2d 496 (1969) (applying Hodges decision in a delinquency proceeding); State v. Flinn, 208 S.E.2d 538, 549 (W. Va. 1974)
(portions of PINS statute unconstitutionally vague in the context of a criminal prosecution for contributing to the delinquency of a minor). See .also Alsager v. District
Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (finding the provisions of an Iowa parentchild termination statute unconstitutional on vagueness, substantive and procedural
due process grounds).
129. See, e.g., bz re Napier, 532 P.2d 423 (Okla. 1975); Blondheim v. State, 84
Wash. 2d 874, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975); In re Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d
432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550,
270 N.E.2d 389 (1971); E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970); Sheehan v. Scott, 520 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1975)
(affirming dismissal of action challenging constitutionality of subsection of Illinois
PINS statute dealing with habitual truancy; rejecting claims of vagueness, overbreadth, and invasion of privacy, the court concluded that no substantial constitutional
question was raised); cf. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242
(M.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that, with the exception of a few words and phrases, juvenile curfew ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague; court also rejected first
amendment, equal protection, and substantive due process arguments). In response
to E.S.G. v. State and the dissenting opinion therein of Justice Cadena, 447 S.W.2d
225, 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), the Texas legislature enacted a highly specific PINS
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the Supreme Court has thus far declined to decide the issue. 130
By far the most successful challenges in the PINS area have been
rearguard attacks on institutional placements in individual cases,131
and federal court class actions to compel adequate treatment and to
prohibit inhumane punishments and conditions in the institutions
statute. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.03(b) (Supp. 1975), amending, True. FAM.
CODE .ANN. § 51.03(b) (1973); see Dawson, Delinquent Children and Children in
Need of Supervision: Draftsman's Comments to Title 3 of the Texas Family Code,
5 TEXAS TEcH. L. REV. 509, 519 (1974). Thus, even if accepted, arguments based
on vagueness and overbreadth would not result in the demise of the PINS jurisdiction,
since such statutory infirmities are curable.
130. In In re Negron, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972), the Supreme Court dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question an appeal that challenged the New York PINS
statute on a number of grounds, including vagueness. Thereafter, the Second Circuit
held that this summary disposition constituted a decision on the merits of the vagueness issue and that it was binding on lower federal courts. See Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d 666, 672-73 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, sub nom. Mercado v. Carey,
420 U.S. 925 (1975). As noted by the Second Circuit, however, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged that summary affirrnances, and presumably other summary dispositions, " 'are not of the same precedental value as would be an opinion of this Court
treating the question on the merits.' " 502 F.2d at 673, quoting Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974). But see McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commn.,
44 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S. March 22, 1976) (percuriam) (No. 75-783).
Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424, (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971) (three-judge court)
held void for vagueness and permanently enjoined enforcement of that portion of the
California PINS statute directed at children "who from any cause • . . [are] in
danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life." The suit was a class action brought by nine children who were arrested pursuant to the above provision and
against whom charges were dropped prior to the district court's decision. An appeal
to the Supreme Court was docketed on April 9, 1971, 39 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S.) (No.
70-120). Three years later, in Mailliard v. Gonzalez, 416 U.S. 918 (1974), the
Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case "for reconsideration of the
injunction in light of" Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), and Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), thus raising the questions of whether injunctive relief
was improvidently granted and whether the case was moot.
In State v. Mattiello, 4 Conn. Cir. 55, 225 A.2d 507, appeal denied, 154 Conn.
737, 225 A.2d 201 (1966), the Connecticut court rejected a vagueness challenge to
that state's PINS statute. After noting probable jurisdiction, 391 U.S. 963 (1968),
the Supreme Court subsequently dismissed for want of a properly presented federal
question, presumably because there was an unappealed concurrent sentence under an
analogous criminal statute, Mattiello v. State, 395 U.S. 209 (1969).
The New York Wayward Minor Act was declared unconstitutional on vagueness
and eighth amendment grounds by a three-judge district court in Gesicki v. Oswald,
336 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The decision was affirmed summarily by the
Supreme Court, 406 U.S. 913 (1972). Because the statute was part of the state's
criminal law dealing with older adolescents and permitted incarceration in adult correctional facilities, the decision has limited precedental value for PINS cases.
131. See, e.g., People v. Grieve, 131 Ill. App. 2d 1078, 267 N.E.2d 19 (1971);
In re John H., 48 App. Div. 2d 879, 880, 369 N.Y.S.2d 196, 198 (2d Dept. 1975)
(per curiam) (reversing disposition because "placement in a State Training School
is a drastic course of action that should, where there are suitable options, only be
used as a last resort"); In re Jeanette M., 40 App. Div. 2d 977, 338 N.Y.S.2d 177
(2d Dept. 1972) (per curiam); In re Stanley M., 39 App. Div. 2d 746, 332 N.Y.S.2d
125 (2d Dept. 1972) (per curiam); In re Jeanette P., 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 662,
310 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (2d Dept. 1970) (per curiam) (reversing training school
placement where "the record contains positive evidence that [such] placement • . •
would be harmful").
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themselves. 132 Some state legislatures have also initiated reforms in
the dispositional area by prohibiting the institutionalization of PINS
altogether, 133 or by barring their placement in secure facilities or in
facilities that house delinquents. 134
132. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974) (class action brought on behalf of boys aged 12-18 committed to the Indiana
training school, one third of whom were PINS; court prohibited unsupervised, routine
beating with thick paddles and the intramuscular administration of tranquilizers unless such tranquilizers specifically authorized by a physician; it also ruled that the
juveniles had a right to individualized care and rehabilitative treatment); Morales v.
Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973), 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974),
revd. on other grounds, Civil No. 74-3436 (5th Cir., July 21, 1976) (class action brought on behalf of all juvenile delinquents, including PINS, incarcerated
in the Texas training schools; the court found, inter alia, that the following practices were in use: persistent and sometimes bizarre physical abuse of juveniles by
correctional officers, use of tear gas, extended solitary confinement for trivial offenses, racial segregation, punishment for speaking Spanish, censorship of mail, punishment of children who fell asleep during the day even if they were taking sleepinducing medication, and severe limitations on family visitation; the judge enjoined
or restricted the above practices, ordered the closing of two facilities, and directed
that a treatment program for all children be established); Inmates of Boys' Training
School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972) (class action brought on behalf
of boys incarcerated in the Rhode Island training school as a result of "voluntary"
commitment by parents, detention pending trial, or adjudication as a delinquent,
PINS, dependent or neglected child; court found these children were subjected to prolonged isolation in cold, dark cells, transfers to adult prison, lack of proper medical
care, education for only one and a half hours per day, and deprivation of food for a
16-hour period each day); Lollis v. New York State Dept. of Social Services, 322
F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 328 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (action to enjoin
prolonged isolation of children, including PINS, committed to the New York training
school).
133. See ALAS. STAT. § 47.10.080(j) (1975), as interpreted in In re E.M.D.,
490 P.2d 658 (Alas. 1971). But see L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alas. 1976)
(PINS child who violates court orders by repeatedly running away may be found
guilty of criminal contempt and institutionalized in a secure facility which also
houses less violent delinquents).
134. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-2(1)(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); MASS.
ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 39G (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-31 (D) (Supp. 1973);
S.D. COMP. LAWS § 26-8-40.1 {Supp. 1974).
See In re Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973)
(prohibiting commitment of PINS children together with delinquents); In re Lavette
M., 35 N.Y.2d 136, 316 N.E.2d 314, 359 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1974) (allowing placement
of PINS children in state training school in which no delinquents were housed).
Following the decision in In re Lavette M., a federal court class action was brought
challenging the use of state training schools for PINS, contending that such placements violate the eighth amendment, the equal protection clause, the rights of travel
and association, and the right to treatment. See McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d
757 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversing district court's abstention ruling, remanding for
determination of the right to treatment issue, and finding plaintiffs' other constitutional claims too insubstantial to warrant convening of three-judge district court).
A recent study indicates that administrative officials have subverted the legislative
distinction between PINS and delinquents and that, notwithstanding the establishment of separate training schools for PINS children in New York, there has been
no substantial improvement in their care and treatment, which differ little from that
given delinquents. "[f]he newly reorganized training schools are separate but equal
in all significant respects." INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE ELLERY C.
DECISION: A CASE STUDY OF JUDICIAL REGULATION OF JUVENILE STATUS OFFENDERS 42-47, 52-62 (1975).
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Despite these procedural and dispositional reforms, many critics
continue to question the wisdom of maintaining juvenile court jurisdiction over PINS cases. 135 In their view, a court's PINS jurisdiction
is both a vehicle for parents to coerce their children into adopting
rigid codes of behavior and a dumping ground for the children of
neglectful or unstable parents who wish to divest themselves of custodial responsibility.136 Another criticism is that the court offers the
illusion of assistance to indigent parents who cannot afford private
schooling or psychiatric treatment for their problem children, but in
reality provides junior jails and a paucity of other "resources."137 By
stigmatizing these children as being "in need of supervision" and by
institutionalizing them, the court reinforces a child's negative selfimage and may convert a rebellious adolescent, who could conceivably
The Texas Family Code, effective September 1, 1973, arguably prohibited absolutely the placement of truant and runaway PINS in state training schools. See TEX,
FAM. CoDE ANN. §§ 51.03(a)(2), 51.03(b)(4), 54.05(g) (1973). Compare Dawson, supra note 129, at 517-20 (concluding that runaway and truant PINS could be
placed at the state training school if such an adjudicated PINS child had violated
probation for the third time) with Steele, The Treatment of Juveniles Under the
Family Code: An Overview, 5 TEXAS TECH. L. R.Ev. 589, 590 (1974) (concluding
that "[a] child can never be committed because of truancy or runaway").
By amendments effective September 1, 1975, however, Texas law permits placement of truant and runaway PINS who subsequently violate court orders in designated state training schools that may not house delinquents. All other adjudicated
PINS children (i.e., those who commit minor misdemeanors or who drive while intoxicated) who subsequently violate probation may be committed to training schools together with delinquents. True. FAM. Com, ANN. §§ 51.03(a)(2), 51.03(b)(4) (Supp.
1975), TEX. CIV. STAT. art. 5143d, § 12(b) (Supp. 1975).
135. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 25-27; WHITE HOUSE CON•
FERENCE ON CHrr.DREN, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 381-82 (1970); Bazelon, Beyond
Control of the Juvenile Court, 21 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 42 (1970); McNulty, The Right
To Be Left Alone, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 141, 149-50 (1972); Stiller & Elder, PINS
-A Concept in Need of Supervision, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 33, 59-60 (1974); YALE
PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1405-07; E. WAKIN, supra note 29, at 127-29; BOARD
OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, Jurisdiction O1•cr
Status Offenses Should Be Removed from the Juvenile Court, 21 CRIME & DELINQ,
97 (1975); N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1975, Editorial, at 32, col. 2 (late city ed.).
Most recently, the Juvenile Justice Standards Project, chaired by Chief Judge Irving Kaufman of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and cosponsored by the Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association, has recommended, inter alia, that the PINS jurisdiction be abolished. This rec•
ommendation will be submitted for adoption at the American Bar Association convention in the summer of 1976. Inasmuch as this proposal is the outgrowth of a
comprehensive five-year study of juvenile law by a highly prestigious body, there may
be a greater possibility that it will influence state legislatures. See Kaufman, Of
Juvenile Justice and Injustice, 66 A.B.A.J. 730, 731, 733 (1976); N.Y.L.J., Dec.
1, 1975, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (late city ed.).
136. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 27; E. WAKIN, supra note 29, at
128; Bazelon, supra note 135, at 43.
137. See YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1399-1401; BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 135; cases cited in note
132 supra.

May 19761

The Stubborn and Rebellious Son

1129

outgrow the tendency toward misbehavior, into a young criminal. 138
To the extent that PINS children are either delinquent or neglected,
they should be so treated by the court; attempting to classify other
children as PINS and to provide services for them squanders the
court's limited resources, which should be conserved for those who
truly require judicial intervention.139 On the basis of such reasoning,
commentators have suggested either partial or complete elimination
of juvenile court jurisdiction over status offenses.140
In the face of these repeated criticisms, the PINS jurisdiction
survives in every state and in the District of Columbia. Although
they are not always fully articulated, the reasons given for retention of
the PINS jurisdiction are several: PINS behavior is an accurate basis
for predicting delinquent conduct, and court jurisdiction allows timely
action that may prevent future criminal acts; 141 while many PINS
children may in fact be neglected, proof is difficult to secure, and a
PINS finding is an alternative means of enabling the court to help the
child;142 at least some PINS children engage in life-threatening behavior, making rapid judicial intervention imperative;143 the court should
be available as a means of reinforcing parental authority and as a last
resort when parent-child conflicts become irreconcilable, for even the
child's mere awareness of the court's existence may prevent more
serious overt misconduct. 144 Finally, even those who acknowledge
138. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26; YALE PINS STUDY, supra note
33, at 1401; Bazelon, supra note 135, at 43 (1970); Gough, The Beyond-Control
Child and the Right to Treatment: An Exercise in the Synthesis of Paradox, 16 ST.
Loms U. L.J. 182, 191 (1971); cf. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 590-93
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
139. See YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1391-94; Stiller & Elder, supra note
135, at 59-60.
140. Compare TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26-27 (suggesting that, if
retained, the PINS jurisdiction be limited to misconduct which "carries a real risk
of long-term harm to the child"), with YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 140607 (advocating elimination of ungovemability jurisdiction, since "the failure to save
a few unfortunate youths must be measured against the law's known and unavoidable
negative consequences"). See also Dembitz, Ferment and Experiment in New York:
Juvenile Cases in the New Family Court, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 508 (1963) (discussing the possibility of substituting a "no-fault" custody proceeding in place of
PINS and delinquency actions).
141. See S.S. v. State, 299 A.2d 560, 570 (Me. 1973); cf. Sheridan, Juveniles Who
Commit Noncriminal Acts: Why Treat in a Correctional System?, 31 FED. PROBATION 26, 30 (1967); but see E. ScHUR, ·RADICAL NoN-lNTERVENTION 46, 50, 51
(1973).
142. Cf. YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1392-93.
143. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26-27; cf. Martin & Snyder, Jurisdiction over Status Offenses Should Not Be Removed from the Juvenile Court, 22
CRIME & DELINQ. 44 (1976).
144. See District of Columbia v. BJ.R., 332 A.2d 58, 61, 62 (D.C. App. 1975);
Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550,-, 270 N.E.2d 389, 394 (1971); but see
Bazelon, supra note 135, at 44.
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systemic deficiencies claim that they can be remedied by an infusion
of resources. 145
Judicial reluctance to sustain constitutional attacks on PINS statutes and legislative disinclination to repeal such laws may well stem
from a lack of awareness of the nature of PINS cases that make up
the bulk of juvenile court dockets. The overwhelming number of
guilty pleas or admissions to PINS charges and the dearth of appeals
based on fully developed records effectively obscure the inherent
deficiencies of the PINS jurisdiction. 146 Since so few PINS cases are
appealed, appellate courts may consider obvious injustices to be
aberrations that can be easily remedied by individual reversals, 147 and
may thus believe that drastic institutional reform through constitutional invalidation of PINS statutes is unnecessary. 148 Only by the
emergence of an adversary system149 in which charges are closely
scrutinized, facts vigorously contested, all available defenses asserted,
and appeals taken in large numbers, can appellate courts and legislatures be fully apprised of the endemic ills of the PINS jurisdiction. 160
145. See S.S. v. State, 299 A.2d 560, 570 (Me. 1973) ("We think no reasonable
man would shoot a sound horse because his saddle stirrup needs repairs"); YALE
PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1402 n.117.
· 146. "By and large, the juvenile court system has operated without appellate surveillance." TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 8, at 40. The paucity of appeals stems
from the infrequency of contested PINS cases at the trial level. See YALE PINS
STul>Y, supra note 33, at 1394 n.80; Stiller & Elder, supra note 135, at 39 n.35.
147. See, e.g., Sorrels v. Steele, 506 P.2d 942 (Okla. 1973). In reversing an adjudication against a 14-year-old girl based on her having stayed out all night and having had unlawful sexual intercourse, the court noted that the trial judge, inter alia,
refused to give notice of the charges, permitted wholesale introduction of hearsay evidence, and refused to appoint appellate counsel to represent the child. The appellate
court observed: "Neither the record, nor the response filed by the [trial] court reflects any logical basis for the orders entered." 506 P.2d at 945.
148. Cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). In rejecting appellants' argument that jury trials were necessary to prevent prejudgment by juvenile
court judges, the court said that such a contention ignored "every aspect of fairness,
of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates." 403 U.S. at 550.
149. See In re Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111, 115 (Iowa 1972) (court noted disapprovingly that the child's attorney had joined in the state's brief instead of filing
a separate independent brief on behalf of his client). See also Sorrels v. Steele, 506
P.2d 942, 945 (Okla. 1973) (child's attorney prosecuted an appeal although not appointed by the trial court, and the appellate court stated that "[c]ounsel for appellant is to be commended for his effort and persistence in pursuing justice in the best
tradition of his profession"). Cf. Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1220 (Alas.
1975) (in mandamus action by child's attorney, court ruled that where interests of
parent and juvenile in PINS case are adverse, child's right to attorney of her own
choice rather than lawyer designated by her parents should have been respected).
150. See generally A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JusncE (1967), discussing the "twilight of the adversary system" in adult criminal courts, id. at 26-31, and pointing out
the manner in which the "ameliorative-therapeutic" techniques of the "socialized" juvenile courts have been appropriated by the criminal courts to induce guilty pleas,
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VALUE OF AN .ADJUDICATORY HEARING
IN PINS CASES

The potential of the adjudicatory hearing for combatting the
abuses of the PINS jurisdiction has not yet been fully realized.
Although there has been a systematic development of legal defenses
for the adjudicatory phase of delinquency cases, there has been no
comparable growth in the context of PINS proceedings. There are
several related reasons for this disparity.
First, because delinquency actions are based on penal law violations, 101 attorneys naturally perceived delinquency cases as junior
criminal trials. Consequently, they readily applied the traditional
defenses and procedural protections of adult criminal trials to juvenile
court delinquency proceedings. 152 In contrast, the allegations in
most PINS cases concern intra-family and school conflicts that have
no apparent relationshlp to the criminal law. 153 Furthermore, there
id. at 170-79, so that "much of the system's potential danger is hidden by secret negotiations." Id. at 179.
151. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text, illustrating how some delinquency statutes include noncriminal acts within their definitions, and some PINS
statutory definitions include criminal acts.
152. See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 370 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1967) (corroboration of extrajudicial confession); Smith v. State, 525 P.2d 1251 (Okla. 1974) (corroboration of accomplice testimony); In re Roderick P., 7 Cal. 3d 801, 810-11, 500
P.2d 1, 7, 103 Cal. Rptr. 425, 430-31 (1972) (Miranda rule); In re LB., 99 N.J.
Super. 589, 596, 240 A.2d 709, 713 (Union County Ct. 1968) (search and seizure);
In re Holley, 107 R.I. 615, 268 A.2d 723 (1970) (Wade-Gilbert lineup :rµle).
153. Typical PINS charges such as truancy, incorrigibility, and running away
from home have no criminal-law counterparts. Thus, it may be contended that traditional defenses and due process guarantees available in criminal cases (e.g., exclusion of illegally obtained evidence or confessions, duress, self-defense) are inapplicable in PINS proceedings. There are, however, situations where such defenses can
and should be used. For instance, if a girl runs away from home because she has
been raped by her step-father, see, e.g., E. WAKIN, supra note 29, at 12, even though
he is not subject to criminal prosecution or conviction because there is a stringent
corroboration requirement for rape in the particular jurisdiction, she should be able
to assert self-defense or necessity as defenses to PINS charges. In states which classify runaways as PINS only when they have left home "without just cause," e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-53(b) (Supp. 1975), the defense is statutory; but even
in jurisdictions whose PINS statutes contain no such qualification with respect to running away from home, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-5(g) (Cum. Supp. 1975); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 62.040-l(b)(3) (1973), the rape should be available as a traditional
criminal-law defense or as a basis for asserting that the child is neglected rather than
a PINS. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-5(h), (i) (Cum. Supp. 1975); Nev.
Rev. Stat.§§ 62.040-l(a)(2), (3) (1973). See text at notes 256-83 infra concerning
the defense of "contributory neglect."
Similarly, other situations may call for assertion of criminal law defenses. See,
e.g., In re Henry G., 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 281, 285, 104 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588, 591
(1972) (child alleged that he "acted involuntarily in self-defense" when his mother
pulled his hair); In re D.L.S., 520 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (revocation of probation proceeding in which child asserted defense of duress against charge
of running away from home; court assumed arguendo that the defense was available,
but found it unsupported by the evidence).
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is no obvious analogue in matters of civil law that could be easily
adapted to provide defenses in ungovemability proceedings.1 1i 4
The criminal law exclusionary rules present special problems in PINS cases. For
example, if a boy told his mother that he truanted, this "confession" would presumably be admissible in a PINS action, since there is no custodial interrogation by an
agent of the state. Cf. In re B.D.A., 524 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (rejecting juvenile's claim that confession of car theft to mother was inadmissible in delinquency proceeding). An argument could be made, however, that parental testimony
disclosing the child's confidences should be excluded because it contravenes the purpose of the juvenile code, which is "to preserve and strengthen the minor's family
ties whenever possible." CAL. WELP. & JNSTNS. CODE§ 502 (West Supp. 1976).
If the Gault decision applies in PINS cases, see note 118 s11pra, a similar admission made to a police officer who has taken the child into custody would be excluded
if obtained without the appropriate Miranda warnings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4257 (1967). Because Gault stressed the difficulties involved in obtaining waivers of
the privilege against self-incrimination from children and focused on the "presence
and competence of parents" as a factor in determining the validity of the waiver, 387
U.S. at 55-56, some states in delinquency cases have required that both parent and
child be advised of the child's right and consent to the waiver. See, e.g., In re Aaron
D., 30 App. Div. 2d 183, 185, 290 N.Y.S.2d 935, 937 (1st Dept. 1968). In the typical PINS case, where the interests of parent and child are adverse, such parental consent is not helpful in determining the validity of the waiver. Therefore, in such
cases, the presence of the child's attorney appears to be necessary to assure the voluntariness of the waiver. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55-56 (1967); see also 111
re F.G., 511 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (construing statute, that was also
applicable in PINS cases, so as to require concurrence of child's attorney in waiver
of privilege against self-incrimination in delinquency proceeding; statute subsequently
amended to eliminate this requirement, see TE.x. FAM. CooE ANN. § 51.09 (Supp.
1975) ).
Similar problems arise with respect to exclusion of illegally obtained evidence.
See, e.g., Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (holding
search and seizure in delinquency case by school principal acting in loco parentis was
not within the protection of the fourth amendment; "[t]he same procedure employed
by the principal, if used by the boy's father, would not violate security of appellant
under the Fourth Amendment"); In re Christopher W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105
Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); In re J.M.A., 542 P.2d 170 (Alas. 1975) (in delinquency
case, foster parent held not agent of the state for fourth amendment purposes),
154. While a superficial analogy may be drawn between PINS cases and custody
matters, since each is concerned with placement of the child, the differences between
the two are substantial. In the latter case, two or more parties, who are usually relatives of the child, vie for his or her physical custody. In many PINS proceedings,
petitioning parents or guardians are seeking to divest themselves of custodial duties,
and the end result may be either institutionalization or placement of the child with
strangers. Furthermore, in PINS cases jurisdiction is based on misconduct of the
child, while in custody actions the focus of inquiry shifts to the relative suitability
of opposing adults to care for the child. While parental misconduct may be relevant
in both custody and PINS proceedings, it does not always constitute a defense to
PINS charges, see text at notes 256-83 infra, and is only one facet of PINS law,
whereas there are many points of congruence between criminal and delinquency law.
Moreover, in custody actions, great weight is often given to the preferences of teenage children concerning the party with whom they wish to reside. See, e.g., 111 re
Ross, 29 Ill. App. 3d 157, 170, 329 N.E.2d 333, 342-43 (1975). But in PINS cases,
most of which involve midadolescents, see, e.g., YALE PINS STUDY, s11pra note 33,
at 1386-87, the child's preference not to be placed outside the home is given little
weight in the dispositional determination.
Confusion about the similarities between PINS and custody actions may be fostered by the fact that some PINS charges are brought by parents or other relatives
as an expeditious means of securing custody of their child or of divesting other per-
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A second reason for the failure to develop PINS defenses is that
attorneys are relative newcomers to the juvenile court. Only after the
Gault decision in 1967 was there a massive infusion of attorneys into
juvenile courts,155 which had formerly been the virtually exclusive
domain of judges and probation officers. 156 Upon entering this new
forum, attorneys were confronted by both customary and statutory
decrees that the "best interests of the child" doctrine was to govern
the mode of legal representation. 157 As a result, some abdicated their
traditional adversarial role and deferred to the recommendations of
psychiatrists, social workers and probation officers.158 Attorneys
sons of custodial rights; such actions are an obvious perversion of the PINS proceeding. See In re Morris W., 79 Misc. 2d 567, 360 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Fam. Ct. 1974) (dismissing PINS petition brought by maternal great-grandmother alleging child left her
home to live with his mother); cf. People v. Grieve, 131 Ill. App. 2d 1078, 267
N.E.2d 19 (1971).
155. A few jurisdictions provided the right to counsel for children in juvenile
court prior to Gault. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 37 n.63, 38-41 (1967); N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr §§ 241, 741(a) (McKinney 1975).
156. See, e.g., L FORER, "No ONE WILL LISSEN" 11, 32-35 (1970); TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 5, 6; Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts,
and Individualized Justice, 19 HARv. L. REV. 775, 796-99 (1966).
In Gault, Justice Fortas observed that neither the probation officer nor the judge
could act as counsel for or otherwise represent the child. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
35-36 (1967). But cf. In re Anonymous, 110 Ariz. 98, 515 P.2d 600 (1973), appeal
dismissed, 417 U.S. 939 (1974), holding that the trial judge's supervision of juvenile
court staff did not prevent the judge from being an impartial trier of fact. 110 Ariz.
at 100-02, 515 P.2d at 602-04. In dissenting from dismissal of the appeal, Justice
Douglas asserted that "appellant was denied the right to jury trial and forced to trial
before a judge with the duty of supervising the prosecutorial staff solely because he
is a juvenile. . . • I can find no justification for this discrimination ..•." 417
U.S. at 941. See also In re G.K., 497 P.2d 914 (Alas. 1972) (holding that children
were entitled to request disqualification of juvenile court judge on the ground of
bias).
157. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 13, § 351 (1959) ("The juvenile court shall have
power . . . to make and enter such judgment and orders • • . as, in the judgment
of the court will properly conserve and protect the welfare and best interests of such
child"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-69(b) (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-286
(Cum. Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-100(17) (1974); Sorrels v. Steele,
506 P.2d 942, 944 (Okla. 1973) (appellate court in reversing adjudication quoted trial
judge's statement that, "In a Juvenile Hearing we are all interested only in the welfare
of the child, and the rules of evidence are somewhat relaxed"). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970) (rejecting, as a basis for depriving an alleged delinquent of the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the New York Court of
Appeals' view that "a child's best interest is not necessarily or even probably, promoted if he wins in the particular inquiry which may bring him to the juvenile
court"). Cf. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 53-64 (1973), suggesting that, by the time a child's case finally reaches
the juvenile court, it is impossible to act in his or her "best interests," and that the
most the court can do is provide the least detrimental alternative.
158. See A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS 163-75 (1969); Fox, supra note 126, at
1237 ("There are, of course, institutional pressures on the lawyer to cooperate with
court officials-to follow their views on what sorts of cases need to be tried and what
rights to be asserted").
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whose concept of advocacy has been shaped by the "best interests"
doctrine are unlikely to assert defenses that may result in a disposition
contrary to the recommendations of "expert" court staff. Other
lawyers, well aware that their clients are minors, substitute their own
judgments as to what is best for the children.159 On yet another level
are attorneys who actually identify with the complaining parents and
in effect adopt their cause. In all these situations, the prospect for
the assertion of defenses in a forceful and creative manner is bleak.
A third reason for the dearth of acknowledged defenses in PINS
proceedings is that in the vast majority of these cases there is no
adjudicatory hearing. 160 Instead, the child pleads guilty, in effect, by
admitting the factual allegations of the petition or complaint, thus
dispensing with the opportunity to raise legal defenses to the
charges.161 After the child makes an admission, the court proceeds
to the dispositional stage, which focuses on the appropriate treatment
for the juvenile. Although relevant at the dispositional hearing,
evidence relating to a defense such as parental provocation or misconduct will generally affect the minor's placement rather than his or her
status as an incorrigible. 162
159. See A. PI.Arr, supra note 158, at 167.
160. See Stiller & Elder, supra note 135, at 39 n.35; Comment, In Re Gault:
Children Are People, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1204, 1210 (1967); YALE PINS STUDY, supra
note 33, at 1389 n.50, 1394 n.80 (even in New York, which has provided right to
counsel since 1962, a random sampling of PINS cases in two counties showed full
or partial admissions to the allegations in 100 per cent of the cases in one county
and in 94 per cent of the cases in the other).
161. See notes 39, 43-50 supra and accompanying text. In those jurisdictions requiring a separate finding that the child is in need of care or treatment as an incorrigible, it is arguable that evidence establishing a defense would be admissible to prove
that no such need existed and thus would defeat the juvenile's adjudication or disposition as a PINS. But see In re O.H., 512 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. App. 1974), a proceeding alleging both PINS and delinquent conduct, based on the child's escape from the
custody of juvenile officers. The court held that the boy's flight was sufficient to
establish conduct "injurious to his welfare," and gave the court authority to proceed
to disposition, noting that "[a] specific finding that the child is in need of care and
treatment is unnecessary if the operative facts of injurious conduct are found." 512
S.W.2d at 427. Cf. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974) (holding that
under Federal Youth Corrections Act, in order to treat defendant as an adult, the
district court is required to make an explicit finding that the youth will not benefit
from treatment afforded under the Act, but is not required to give reasons for its
finding).
162. In Oklahoma, for example, there is explicit statutory recognition that a child
who is the victim of parental misconduct may nonetheless be adjudicated a PINS.
Thus, in entering a dispositional order placing the child in his or her home, "if it
appears to the court that the conduct of such parent or guardian has contributed to
such delinquency, or need of supervision, or dependency or neglect, the court may
issue a written order specifying conduct to be followed by such parent or guardian
with respect to such child." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1116(a)(1) (Cum. Supp.
1975). See also In re S.M.G., 291 S.2d 43 (Fla. App. 1974), in which, as part of
an order of disposition against a delinquent girl, the court ordered her mother to par-
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There are several explanations for the omission of fact-finding
hearings in an overwhelming percentage of PINS cases. One may
reasonably infer from the numerous admissions in PINS cases that
most of the children involved tell their attorneys that all or part of the
charges against them are true. 163 This fact, taken in conjunction
with the pervasive influence of the "best interests" doctrine, leads
some attorneys to feel ethically foreclosed from pursuing an adjudicaticipate in the daughter's drug rehabilitation program. When the mother refused to
do so, she was adjudged in contempt of court. In reversing on the ground that there
was no jurisdiction to enter such an order, the appellate court observed, "[I]bere
are, as all know, bard core cases attended by recalcitrant or unfit parents, and there
are those cases unfortunately for which there is no solution. In these latter cases
even the possession of the statutory power over such parents would probably be selfdefeating and lead only to frustration and increase in the jail population." 291 S.2d
at 44. The Florida law has since been amended to authorize court orders directing
parents to participate in such family counseling programs. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.11
(8) (Cum. Ann. Supp. 1975), amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.11 (1961).
It should also be noted that, in a PINS case, entry of a guilty plea or admission
of the allegations may arguably be a bar to subsequent assertion of innocence based
on affirmative defenses, since, at least in the criminal law context, an otherwise valid
guilty plea, accompanied by evidence of the defendant's guilt, permits the court to
impose sentence notwithstanding the defendant's claim of innocence. North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). A guilty plea in a criminal case also waives all antecedent constitutional defects of a nonjurisdictional nature. Compare McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (if otherwise valid guilty plea, defendant waives
right to assert that such plea was induced by a coerced confession), with Blackledge
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (guilty plea does not waive due process claim that state
bad no power to charge defendant at all on the particular offense, since defendant
had been convicted of misdemeanor assault and when be appealed, the state charged
him with felony assault based on the same act). Waiver by guilty plea in a criminal
court has likewise been applied so as to bar a claim that a juvenile hearing resulting
in transfer to the adult court did not comport with due process. See Harris v. Procunier, 498 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 970 (1974). Where, however,
a state statute permits appellate review of constitutional claims after entry of a guilty
plea, the plea is not a waiver of the right to assert such claims in federal habeas
corpus proceedings. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975).
Applying the foregoing principles to the PINS context, one court has held that
an admission does not waive the right to assert the unconstitutionality of the PINS
statute, since this is a jurisdictional challenge. See Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d
666, 672 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Mercado v. Carey, 420 U.S. 925
(1975); cf. Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (three-judge
court), affd. mem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972). Moreover, in those jurisdictions that require a finding that the PINS child is in need of care and treatment in addition to
the finding that he or she committed the acts alleged in the petition, it is arguable
that, even if the juvenile admits the acts, he or she may assert affirmative defenses
as a means of rebutting the assertion of a need for care and treatment. See note
39 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Specht v. Patterson, 388 U.S. 605 (1967),
holding that where conviction of a criminal act triggers commencement of a separate
commitment procedure, whether labelled criminal or civil, which requires a new finding of fact that defendant is either a threat to the community or a habitual offender,
such a finding must be made at a due process hearing that includes the rights to counsel and to cross-examination. But see In re O.H., 512 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Mo. App.
1974), discussed in note 161 supra.
163. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 33; cf. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILI1Y DR 7-102(A) (7), prohibits an attorney from assisting his client "in
conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent."
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tory hearing because -it may result in a dismissal of the charges, a
development that will supposedly foster in the children a belief that
they can "beat the rap" and successfully thwart parental discipline. 104
Indeed, a child's lawyer may think that the decision of the office of
probation not to adjust the case during the intake procedure indicates
that experts have determined the complaint to be meritorious and the
child to be in need of the court's help.
Moreover, many PINS children come from low socioeconomic
groups and do not relate well to middle-class attorneys. 10 G They may
also be non-English speaking100 or inarticulate, 167 reticent about
airing family problems with a stranger,168 or brain-damaged, retarded
or mentally disturbed. 169 When dealing with such children, attorneys
164. See A. PLATI, supra note 158, at 167; Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, The
Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the Role of Counsel, 39 FORDHAM L. REV.
375, 389-90 (1971).
165. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 56-57 (1967); TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, nt 41-42; L PORER, supra note 156, at 25-26; Fox, supra
note 126, at 1236. See generally JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED, supra note 55, at
23-24.
166. See Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 172-73 (E.D. Tex. 1973), revd.
on other grounds, Civil No. 74-3436 (5th Cir., July 21, 1976) (challenging the con•
ditions at certain juvenile correctional facilities; the court found that inmates'
conversation in Spanish was discouraged or punished, even though almost a
quarter of the juveniles were Mexican-American, some of whom could "speak little
or no English"). See also In re Jose R., 49 App. Div. 2d 869, 376 N.Y.S.2d 906
(1st Dept. 1975), reversing delinquency disposition on the ground, inter alia, that
no Spanish interpreter was present at the hearing.
167. See JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED, supra note 55, at 24-25; L. PORER,
supra note 156, at 36.
168. For example, a child may be reluctant to tell the attorney that he or she
stays away from home frequently because one or both parents are alcoholics.
169. Many states recognize that mentally disturbed and retarded children are subject to the court's jurisdiction, and have statutory provisions for dealing with them.
See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INSTNS. CODE § 6550 (West 1972); TEX. FAM, CODE ANN,
§§ 55.01, 55.02, 55.03 (1975). See In re Kevin M., 44 App. Div. 2d 800, 369
N.Y.S.2d 439 (1st Dept. 1975) (reversing a delinquency disposition to the state training school where the trial court refused to authorize neurological examination notwithstanding mental health reports indicating the need therefor). See also Creek v.
Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (appeal dismissed as moot, but court determined that child held in interim detention who requires psychiatric care is entitled
to receive it).
There is a conflict in the courts over the availability of the insanity defense in
juvenile proceedings. Courts rejecting this defense have done so on the ground that
rehabilitation, rather than punishment, is being provided. Compare In re Winburn,
32 Wis. 2d 152, 145 N.W.2d 178 (1966) (accepting insanity defense), with In re
H.C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. Morris County 1969)
(rejecting insanity defense as a bar to an adjudication, but holding that it will preclude imposition of penal sanctions). See Popkin and Lippert, ls There a Constitll•
tional Right to the Insanity Defense in Juvenile Court?, 10 J. FAM. L. 421 (1971 ).
Some states have enacted statutes specifically authorizing the insanity defense, See,
e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 55.05(g) (1975).
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must invest considerable time and patience if they are to elicit factual
information sufficient for developing available defenses; unfortunately,
some attorneys may be unable to make the requisite investment.
Moreover, because they feel that these children will probably be
disbelieved by the trier of fact, lawyers may also question the advisability of permitting their clients to testify. Under these circumstances, an attorney is likely to consider a fact-finding hearing valueless.
Certain perceptions of the parental role in the adjudicatory hearing may also discourage attorneys from presenting vigorous defenses.
A lawyer may feel that a fact-finding hearing would be futile because
the types of allegations that form the basis of most PINS petitions are
generally easy to prove with the testimony of parents or school
officials. 17° Furthermore, some attorneys wish to avoid a courtroom
confrontation between parent and child because it may permanently
damage the family relationship. 171 From a practical standpoint, the
child's lawyer fears that such a clash may so anger the parents that
they will insist upon institutionalization of the minor, a demand that a
court may feel itself obliged to honor. 172 If a parent's desire to keep
a child away from home will inevitably result in that child's placement, an attorney may be disposed to forgo an adjudicatory hearing
and contest only the type of facility to which the juvenile will be sent.
Finally, many attorneys believe that if they bypass a PINS adjudicatory hearing, especially where there appears to be sufficient evidence to sustain a finding against the youth, the judge will be more
likely to render a favorable judgment as to disposition, because the
child has admitted his or her wrongs and has not wasted the court's
time. This belief is, in part, a carryover from experience in criminal
courts, where approximately ninety per cent of all cases are disposed
of through plea-bargaining.173
However persuasive these considerations might appear, they do
not justify a passive role for attorneys representing children in PINS
proceedings. Thus, an attorney should not forgo a fact-finding
hearing on the basis of the "best interests" doctrine. It is often
170. For example, a prima facie case can often be established by use of parental
testimony concerning the child's disobedience, or testimony of school officials concerning the child's truancy.
171. Cf. Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, supra note 164, at 390-91.
172. See YALE PINS Snmv, supra note 33, at 1396.
173. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, supra note 165, at 134-36; D. NEWMAN, CONVICI'ION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT ThIAL 3 (1966); Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE LJ. 1179, 1206-07 n.84, n.85 (1975).
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impossible for all concerned parties to agree that a particular course
of action is most appropriate to resolve the complex intra-family
conflict typically presented in a PINS case. 174 In any event, when the
prosecuting attorney, judge, probation officer and other court personnel all purport to act in the "best interests" of the child, defense
counsel is rendered virtually superfluous if he or she attempts to perform under the same, ill-defined standard. The defense attorney's role
in our legal system is properly that of an advocate, for "an adversary
presentation counters the natural human tendency to judge too swiftly
in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known."170 Indeed, the dominance of the "best interests" doctrine may require
zealous advocacy to ensure that judicial intervention in a child's life
has an adequate basis in law and fact, and that it has not been
triggered merely by generalized complaints, unsupported "expert"
opinions or vague recommendations. 176
Other factors lead to the conclusion that attorneys must not
abandon their traditional adversarial role. An attorney cannot, for
example, assume that the intake procedure has screened out matters
that do not belong in court, for there is evidence that the intake
process is not fully effective, especially in PINS cases. 177 Furthermore, although zealous advocacy would be appropriate even if states
offered optimal care for PINS children, it becomes imperative in light
of indications that the facilities to which the children are relegated
may be far more destructive than the environments from which they
came.11s
174. See, e.g., In re Lloyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 386, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420
(1st Dept 1970) (in reversing a training school disposition, court observed: "[T]he
learned Family Court Judge was doing the best that be could for the appellant in
a well-nigh impossible situation and one with which be never should have been faced.
Frankly, we also are at a loss . . .").
175. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIDILI1Y, EC 7-19 (footnote omitted),
176. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967); Williamson v. State, 242 Ala. 42,
43, 4 S.2d 734, 735 (1941) (mother charged daughter with using obscene language;
court noted mother's "testimony indicates there was no foundation whatever for the
charge").
177. See notes 231-36 infra and accompanying text.
178. See the "right to treatment" cases cited in note 132 supra. There wil1 be
instances in which the child requests placement because of intolerable home conditions. Where such a desire is expressed, the attorney should explore the possibility
of placement on the basis of a neglect petition, after making sure that the child is
not simply expressing a transitory desire or seeking placement in retaliation against
the parent. Finally, the attorney is obliged to explain to his or her client the realities
of life at a state institution. See State ex rel. Wilson v. Bambrick, 195 S.E.2d 721
(W. Va. 1973) (runaway girl given choice of returning home with parents or going
to state training school, and she chose the latter alternative; subsequent writ of habeas corpus granted because of failure to provide attorney at original proceeding);
Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1220 (Alas. 1975) (14-year-old girl who left
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Finally, the seemingly attractive rationale that a child can secure
institutional benefits by making an admission is simply not supported
by the facts. Although a defendant in a criminal court may admit
guilt in return for a reduced sentence, there is no counterpart to this
plea bargaining in the juvenile court system. In making dispositional
determinations, the juvenile court judge places primary reliance on
parental fitness, parental attitudes toward placement, and the probation recommendations as indicators of the child's best interests. Unlike the district attorney in criminal court, the probation department
has no vested interest in rewarding pleas of guilty as a means of
reducing the number of trials; its recommendation is generally not
influenced by whether a PINS finding is based on an evidentiary
hearing or the entry of a plea. 179
Adherence by defense attorneys to a traditional adversary role can
yield several positive benefits for children brought to court under
PINS petitions. The most obvious is that vigorous advocacy during
the fact-finding hearing may reveal defenses or expose defects in what
might have originally seemed an airtight case against the child. But
other, more subtle, benefits may also be realized by demands for factfinding hearings. Among these advantages are an alteration in the
parental role in PINS hearings and a change in the kinds of cases that
occupy juvenile courts.
The probation intake procedure, with its informality, its proparent orientation and its acquiescence to parental pressure that a
petition be filed against a child,180 may lead parents to expect that the
judicial proceedings will be similarly informal and deferential to their
preferences regarding the imposition of punishment. The absence of
a fact-finding hearing reinforces the parents' perception that they are
in control of the proceeding and their resulting belief that there can
be no serious consequences without their consent. They may be
shocked to discover that, once a court has made a finding against a
child and has received a probation recommendation, the judge, not
the parents, determines whether the child is merely reprimanded or
home and sought help of police in obtaining foster placement was made a respondent
in a PINS action when she refused to remain with her parents); THE PINS CmLn,
A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS, supra note 27, at 44 (eight per cent of PINS children
in survey refused to return home to parents).
179. In some instances, however, probation officers may consider the child's refusal to admit his or her misconduct to be evidence of the need for a more restrictive
disposition. This attitude may be a spillover from statutory provisions conditioning
intake adjustment on an admission by the child. See, e.g., PA. STAT• .ANN. tit. 11,
§ 50-304(b)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
180. See YALE PINS SnroY, supra note 33, at 1395.
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instead placed in the state training school.1 81 A fact-finding hearing,
with its attendant formalities of sworn testimony and cross-examination, immediately puts the parents on notice that the proceedings are
weighty, and that they lack control over the outcome. Accordingly,
they may choose not to pursue the matter or, if they persist, to temper
their accusations. Such circumspect parental behavior may well lead
to a more favorable disposition for the child.
Parents may also withdraw PINS charges when faced with the
prospects of cross-examination, which can result in the exposure of
their own inadequacies, and presentation of their child's perspective
of the matters being considered by the court. 182 Even if the parents
do not withdraw the petition, the rules of evidence generally applicable at fact-finding hearings will prevent them from heaping generalized abuse on the child. The prevalent relaxation of the rules of
evidence at the dispositional hearing, however, encourages the receipt
of such testimony. 183 Thus, where there is no fact-finding hearing, a
181. Reyna v. State, 206 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), is perhaps the ultimate example of a case being taken out of the parent's control. There, a mother
who thought she was filing a complaint against her daughter's seducer found herself
the petitioner against the daughter, who was adjudicated a delinquent and committed
to an institution over the mother's protest; the appellate court reversed. See also B.
WAXIN, supra note 29, at 48 (father decided to teach his curfew-violating daughter
a lesson by permitting the police to take her to a detention facility because she was
"out of parental control." After attempting suicide as a means of securing release
from the detention center, she was transferred to a mental hospital: "It took the
girl's father three months to get her out").
182. In New York, a majority of parental PINS cases are withdrawn or dismissed
prior to adjudication. YALE PINS Srul>Y, supra note 33, at 1389 n.47. One reason
may be that in many instances attorneys for the children are able to persuade parent
and child to seek help from community agencies rather than to pursue court action.
Id. at 1399. Activities of this sort, which sometimes include realistic criticisms of
the quality of the court's resources, may account for one family court judge's order
prohibiting a child's attorney from interviewing the petitioner in a PINS case. See
Rapoport v. Berman, N.Y.L.J., July 10, 1975, at 14, col. 8 (temporarily enjoining en•
forcement of this order). The reason given by the juvenile court judge for his order
was that PINS proceedings were civil in nature, and that consequently counsel was
ethically prohibited from interviewing an opposing party. The above decision was re•
versed on the ground that the controversy was "academic," since the family court
judge had not issued a formal written order or directed the institution of contempt
proceedings; the opinion stated, however, that the child's attorney in a PINS proceeding has the right to interview prospective witnesses, including the petitioner, and that
any alleged ethical improprieties should be referred to the appellate court. Rapoport
v. Berman, App. Div., 2d Dept., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 22, 1975, at 9, col. 2.
183. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2316(b) (Supp. 1973) ("Evidence which
is competent, material, and relevant shall be admissible at factfinding hearings, Evidence which is material and relevant shall be admissible at . • . dispositional hearings); ORE REv. STAT. § 419.500(2) (1974) ("For the purpose of determining proper
disposition of the child, testimony, reports or other material relating to the child's
mental, physical and social history and prognosis may be received by the court without regard to their competency or relevancy under the rules of evidence"). See also
PA. STAT• .ANN. tit. 11, 50-316(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (authorizing the court to ex-
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judge's perception of a child's behavior may be based largely on the
parents' conclusory, exaggerated and self-serving charges.
A vigorously contested adjudicatory hearing will sometimes
produce evidence of parental wrongdoing or neglect, which, even if
not sufficient for a dismissal of the proceeding, may result in a more
favorable interim or final disposition for the child.184 For example,
evidence showing that a child runs away from home because of
arguments between parents may induce a judge to arrange for shelter
care rather than secure detention, but such evidence is far less likely
to come to the court's attention in the absence of formal fact-finding.
A final possibility is that the confrontation between parent and
child at an adjudicatory hearing can be a therapeutic rather than an
injurious experience, if it is skillfully guided. 185 Where there is a
severe communication barrier between parent and child,186 the hearing may be the first opportunity for a focused dialogue before a
neutral arbiter, with parent and child on a more or less equal footing.1s1
elude a delinquent child, which includes PINS, during the dispositional hearing);
MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 10-1221(2), (5) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (permitting the
court to receive "social summaries" during a dispositional hearing, and giving the
child and parent the right to cross-examine all persons preparing such reports, but
allowing the court to exclude child and parent from the dispositional hearing); In
re Sylvia J., 47 App. Div. 2d 905, 369 N.Y.S.2d 998 (2d Dept. 1975) (per curiam)
(affirming 18-month placement of PINS in training school and finding that trial
judge did not abuse discretion in denying' child's attorney access to probation report
and permission to cross-examine probation officer); but see In re Cecilia R., 36 N.Y.2d 317, 327 N.E.2d 812, 367 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1975) (reversing placement of 13year-old PINS girl at training school on the ground that her absence from the dispositional hearing without sufficient cause violated due process).
184. See, e.g., In re Henry G., 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 104 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1972).
185. It is doubtful that the courtroom confrontation between parent and child can
cause any more harm to their relationship than the injury that has already occurred
by virtue of the parent's bringing the juvenile to court and charging him or her as
a PINS. The child plainly knows that but for the parent's charges he or she would
not stand accused. Eliminating parental testimony against the child at an adjudicatory hearing or excusing the child from the courtroom during such testimony by the
parent may indeed be more detrimental to the child than allowing the juvenile to hear
the parental accusations, since the allegations imagined by the child may generate
more anger and be more frightening to the youth than the charges that are actually
made.
186. See generally H. GINoTr, BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD 20-21 (1965) ("An
interested observer who overhears a conversation between a parent and a child will
note with surprise how little each listens to the other").
187. It may be argued that such a role is inappropriate and that it is an intolerable demand on the juvenile court judge to combine the functions of psychiatrist, social worker, and judge. Yet, it is this type of multifaceted person who was originally
envisioned as appropriate for the position, and who is in effect called for by statutes
in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr § 124 (McKinney 1975). To
the extent that such judges are unavailable, the unique quality of the juvenile court
is in large part lost, and there is less reason to retain it as a separate entity.
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An increase in the number of fact-finding hearings in PINS cases
and the introduction of more extensive factual probing at these
hearings will necessarily affect the court's workload, which is already
considered excessive by a number of observers. 188 Although this
increase will initially exacerbate the problem, it may also provide the
impetus for long range reform, since bursting court dockets may force
legislative action to curtail the PINS jurisdiction of juvenile courts. 180
At the least, more frequent and more probing hearings will compel
judges to differentiate between transient, relatively trivial misconduct
that is symptomatic of adolescence, such as staying out late, and
serious life-threatening behavior, such as narcotics addiction. 100 Thus,
instead of scattering their resources over a wide spectrum of cases,
juvenile courts would be constrained to dismiss cases of minor misbehavior at the adjudicatory stage, and to focus upon cases involving
truly disturbed children. Indeed, it is possible that one reason for the
heavy caseload of juvenile courts is the failure to cull out complaints
that do not warrant judicial action. As one appellate court has
observed, "The very presence of . . . [this] case upon the docket of
the Juvenile Court, suggests some answer as to why those courts,
nationally, are suffering under almost untriable caseloads . . . . The
incident which gave rise to this case was, under any interpretation, a
'schoolboy fight.' " 101
The court's power to dismiss unwarranted PINS petitions is not
curtailed by a parent's adamant refusal to take his or her child home.
Such intransigence on the parent's part can, in most jurisdictions,
form the basis for a neglect petition. 192 While it is true that some
188. See, e.g., L. PORER, supra note 156, at 84-87 (referring to the "five-minute
assembly-line hearing"); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 7 (citing studies indicating that the average time spent on a juvenile proceeding is 10-15 minutes).
189. "But it is of great importance to emphasize that a simple infusion of resources into juvenile courts and attendant institutions would by no means fulfill the
expectations that accompanied the court's birth and development." TASK FORCE RE•
PORT, supra note 8, at 8.
190. "[J]uvenile courts retain expansive grounds of jurisdiction authorizing judicial intervention in relatively minor matters of morals and misbehavior, on the
ground that subsequent delinquent conduct may be indicated, as if there were • • •
reliable ways of redirecting children's lives." TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at

9.
191. In re Roberts, 13 Md. App. 644, 645, 284 A.2d 621, 622 (1971). Although
this case involved a delinquency adjudication which was affirmed, and although the
appellate court remanded only for further dispositional proceedings, the language
quoted in the text is apposite to PINS cases, particularly in their adjudicatory phase.
192. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.2(b)(l) (Cum. Supp. 1975)
(statutory definition of neglect includes refusal to provide the care necessary for the
child's health, morals or emotional well being); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.13(l)(d)
(1975) (similar provision).
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parents are indifferent to the legal nomenclature and procedure by
which custody of their children is transferred to the state, others will
object if fault is placed upon them by a finding of neglect and may
instead prefer to take their children home. In either case, the children will avoid the stigma of a PINS finding, 193 and those who are
unwanted at home will be placed in a shelter facility for neglected
children, rather than in a secure institution for PINS and delinquent
minors. 194
Insistence on a fact-finding hearing may instill in the child positive feelings toward the judicial process, whether or not the result is
dismissal of the charges. A child's confusion about the legal system
may be heightened where the process is truncated by elimination of
the adjudicatory hearing. Even where the child's attorney has attempted to explain the effect of entering a plea, the child may not
understand the basis for judicial intervention in his or her life. A
child may perceive the sanctions that follow an admission of guilt as
punishment for honesty rather than for misdeeds. 195 If, however, a
finding is made against the child on the basis of extrinsic evidence
193. See E.J. v. State, 471 P.2d 367, 370 (Alas. 1970) (holding that "termination" of a PINS adjudication did not moot the child's appeal because of "potential
collateral disabilities" such as "availability of juvenile records to school authorities,
military service or prospective employers"); Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d
1220, 1226 (Alas. 1975) (holding that, although PINS petition had been dismissed
and child had left the state, case was not moot because issue of child's right to attorney of her own choice rather than lawyer designated by her parents was a recurring question of broad public interest). Contra Brown v. Yeldell, 487 F.2d 1210
(D.C. Cir. 1973); People v. T.B., 183 Colo. 310, 516 P.2d 642 (1973); cf. In re
I.B., 287 A.2d 827 (D.C. App. 1972); In re Richard S., 32 N.Y.2d 592, 300 N.E.2d
426, 347 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1973) (refusing to expunge police and court records of PINS
child whose adjudication was reversed with instructions to dismiss the proceeding;
court held that there was no legislative authority to expunge). See also TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 9, 26 (discussing the stigma accompanying a PINS adjudication).
In many jurisdictions, juvenile court records may be considered by adult criminal
courts for purposes of sentencing. See, e.g., People v. McFarlin, 389 Mich. 557, 208
N.W.2d 504 (1973); Taylor v. Howard, 111 R.I. 527, 304 A.2d 891 (1973); cf.
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (refusal to permit cross-examination of witness
in criminal trial concerning witness' delinquency adjudication violated defendant's
sixth amendment rights). Contra, Lauen v. State, 515 P.2d 578 (Okla. Crim. App.
1973).
194. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2313(a) (Supp. 1973); cf. Martarella v.
Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see State ex rel. Harris v. Larson,
64 Wis. 2d 521, 219 N.W.2d 335 (1974) (reluctantly approving confinement of adjudicated delinquents, PINS and neglected children in a detention facility for up to five
days pending their transfer to placement facilities).
195. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 51-52 (1967) ("[I]t seems probable that where
children are induced to confess by 'paternal' urgings on the part of officials and the
confession is then followed by disciplinary action, the child's reaction is likely to be
hostile and adverse-the child may well feel that he has been led or tricked into confession and that despite his confession, he is being punished") (footnote omitted).
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introduced at a hearing, he or she is more likely to understand
that prior misconduct rather than the admission of guilt was the basis
for the court's action. Even when juveniles do not agree with the
findings, they may appreciate that their side has been presented in
court and that the judges have considered the evidence before rendering the verdict. If a child prevails and the petition is dismissed, a
belief that the system can be circumvented is not necessarily engendered; the child may instead emerge with positive views of the legal
process.
To be sure, there should be no rigid adherence to abstract principles concerning the value of a fact-finding hearing. For a variety of
pragmatic considerations, insistence upon an adjudicatory hearing
will not always be desirable. 196 But the decision to waive a child's
due process right to this hearing should not be made in the vacuum of
the "best interests" doctrine. Wholesale waivers have not only injured certain children who have been inappropriately designated as
PINS; they may also have helped perpetuate a PINS jurisdiction that
is arguably harmful to all children coming before the juvenile court.

V.
A.

DEFENSES IN

PINS

CASES

Statutory Construction: Isolated Incident,
De Minimis, Condonation

In view of the definitional language typically used in PINS statutes, one might reasonably assume that only cases involving serious
forms of persistent juvenile misconduct would be brought to court.
Terms such as "incorrigible,"197 "habitually disobedient," 198 "beyond
parental control,"199 and "in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd
or immoral life,"200 suggest a child who is beyond restraint and on the
196. For example, if insistence on a trial would cause the case to be adjourned
and preclude its being heard by a judge known to be particularly understanding, an
immediate admission may be preferable. See In re D.J.B., 18 Cal. App. 3d 782, 96
Cal. Rptr. 146 (1971), where the child admitted to having run away from home on
one occasion, but denied that she was beyond parental control within the meaning
of the PINS statute. After apparently exaniining the probation report, the trial judge
made a finding against the girl that was reversed on appeal because of the possibility that such an examination had taken place. The appeliate court also noted that
a single instance of running away was insufficient to sustain a PINS charge. An
admission in these circumstances may thus have been based on sound strategic considerations, since a plenary fact-finding hearing might have revealed additional evidence
of misconduct sufficient to sustain a PINS finding.
197. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-45 (Cum. Supp. 1975),
198. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. CoDE § 31-5-7-4.l(b) (Bums Cum. Supp. 1975).
199. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT.§ 419.476(1)(b) (1974),
200. See ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(3) (1958). See also MICH, CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 712A.2(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (leading an immoral life).
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verge of criminality. However, many recent cases illustrate that the
PINS jurisdiction is being invoked, at least at the trial level,201 in
response to relatively minor misconduct that does not appear to fall
within the intended reach of the statutes. In reversing these findings,
appellate courts have insisted upon a narrower interpretation of PINS
definitional provisions. They have concluded that where the misconduct involved was either insufficiently serious, or approved by the
parents, or not repeated, it did not amount to "habitual disobedience"
or "incorrigibility." The decisions of these courts provide authority
for defending PINS actions by showing that statutory requirements for
the exercise of the PINS jurisdiction have not been satisfied.
The rationale most frequently offered in these cases is that an
"isolated incident" of noncriminal misbehavior does not afford a
basis for a PINS finding. Utilizing this theory, courts have dismissed
charges where, on a single occasion, a child truanted, 202 refused to
remain in a foster home, 203 ran away from home, 204 had an altercation
with a parent, 205 or wandered the streets at night. 206
In an analogous line of cases, the isolated incident theory has
been used to overturn PINS findings based on allegations of a single
criminal act. In these cases, the original petitions filed against the
child charged delinquency based on such penal law violations as
harassment, 207 assault, 208 and negligent vehicular homicide.209 At
trial, however, a delinquency adjudication was precluded, either because the act alleged did not constitute a crime, 210 or because there was
201. See, e.g., In re McMillan, 21 N.C. App. 712, 205 S.E.2d 541 (1974).
202. See In re McMillan, 21 N.C. App. 712, 205 S.E.2d 541 (1974). See also
Sheehan v. Scott, 520 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1975), described in note 129 supra; "Sporadic or occasional absence even though violative of the compulsory requirement of
the law does not activate action under the state statute here challenged. That is only
triggered by habitual truancy." 520 F.2d at 830.
203. See In re Rita P., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 95 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1970).
204. See In re D.J.B., 18 Cal. App. 3d 782, 96 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1971); Reyna
v. State, 206 S.W.2d 651, 653-54 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
205. See In re Henry G., 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 104 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1972).
206. See Ex parte Yelton, 298 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
207. See In re David W., 28 N.Y.2d 589, 268 N.E.2d 642, 319 N.Y.S.2d 845
(1971) (per curiam); In re Anna A., 36 App. Div. 2d 1001, 321 N.Y.S.2d 59 (3d
Dept. 1971) (per curiam); In re Richard K, 35 App. Div. 2d 716, 314 N.Y.S.2d
1004 (1st Dept. 1970) (per curiam) (charge of harassment and loitering).
208. See In re Mark V., 34 App. Div. 2d 1101, 312 N.Y.S.2d 983 (4th Dept.
1970) (per curiam); In re Bordone, 33 App. Div. 2d 890, 307 N.Y.S.2d 527 (4th
Dept. 1969) (per curiam) (unclear whether the original delinquency petition charged
assault or harassment, although the acts alleged appear to have been sufficiently serious to constitute assault).
·
209. See In re Williams, 241 Ore. 207,405 P.2d 371 (1965).
210. See cases cited in note 207 supra. In New York, delinquency is defined as
"any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime." N.Y. FAMILY Cr.
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insufficient proof that the child had committed the criminal act. 211
The lower courts attempted to circumvent these evidentiary and legal
obstacles by dismissing the delinquency charges and substituting
PINS findings based on the original penal law offenses. 212 This
subterfuge appears to have influenced appellate court reversals based .
on the isolated incident theory. 213
There are, however, limitations on the use of the theory as a
defense to PINS charges. One court concluded that the California
statute, which is directed against any child who "persistently or
habitually refuses to obey [reasonable parental orders] . . . or who is
beyond [parental] . . . control,"214 permits a PINS finding based on
Acr § 712(a) (McKinney 1975). In the above cases, the original petitions charged
the respondents with harassment and loitering, which, under the New York Penal
Law, are mere violations rather than crimes. See N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 240.25, 240.35
(McKinney 1967). An isolated act of harassment does not fall within the definition
of PINS conduct, since the statute requires habitual disobedience. N.Y. FAMILY Cr.
Acr § 712(b) (McKinney 1975).
211. See In re Williams, 241 Ore. 207, 405 P.2d 371 (1965); In re Mark V., 34
App. Div. 2d 1101, 312 N.Y.S.2d 983 (4th Dept. 1970) (per curiam).
In the Williams case, the trial court dismissed the delinquency petition alleging
negligent vehicular homicide because there was no evidence of reckless driving. The
trial judge determined, however, that the child had driven negligently and made a
PINS finding on this basis. The appellate court reversed, holding that a single act
of negligent driving that violated no law was insufficient to sustain a PINS adjudication where there was no evidence of other driving violations or appearances in juvenile court.
In Mark V., the appellate court reversed a PINS finding based on a single act
of assault because there was no evidence of habitual misconduct, and also found that
there was insufficient evidence to support a delinquency adjudication. In New York,
the crime of assault requires physical injury, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney
1967), whereas harassment, a violation, requires only unauthorized physical contact,
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.25(1) (McKinney 1967).
See also In re Raymond 0., 31 N.Y.2d 730, 338 N.Y.S.2d 105, 290 N.E.2d 14S
(1972) (mem.) (reversing PINS finding based on a single act of criminal trespass,
after trial court had dismissed a burglary charge against the child).
212. See also Kahm v. People, 83 Colo. 300, 304, 264 P. 718, 720 (1928) (one
instance of car theft held insufficient to sustain charge of "incorrigibility" or "growing up in idleness or crime").
There is no inconsistency in treating a single act as a sufficient basis for a delinquency finding yet not a sufficient predicate for a PINS adjudication, since the statutes define delinquency as a single criminal-law violation and PINS as habitual misconduct. Moreover, a single criminal act is, in many instances, serious enough to
warrant judicial intervention, whereas a single act of noncriminal misbehavior is not.
There are, however, certain criminal law offenses such as malicious mischief, see,
e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 28.03(a), (b) (1), 12.23 (1974), that do not warrant
this presumption. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1975) §§ 51.03(a), (b), which
requires that a delinquency finding be based on the commission of felonies and serious misdemeanors and includes as a basis for a PINS adjudication the commission
of three minor misdemeanors.
213. See text at notes 58-116 supra, discussing the abuse and misuse of the PINS
jurisdiction, of which this is one example.
214. CAL. WELF. & INSTNS. CODE§ 601 (West Supp. 1976).
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a single, sufficiently serious act of misconduct. 215 Rejecting the
child's contention that the terms "habitually" and "persistently" modified the parental control clause of the statute, the court held that the
legislature's use of the disjunctive "or" meant that "a single act, if
sufficiently serious, would indicate that the minor was 'beyond
control.' " 216
Another apparent limitation on the isolated incident theory
emerges in those jurisdictions that define as PINS conduct the violation of a "law applicable only to a child," 217 such as juvenile curfew
ordinances. One infraction of such an ordinance constitutes a PINS
violation. Thus, even though the Ohio statute required "habitual
truancy'' to sustain an "unruly child" adjudication, 218 a court upheld a
finding that was based upon a single instance of truancy, because the
same conduct was violative of a local misdemeanor -ordinance prohibiting juveniles from being in the street during school hours. 219
215. See In re David S., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1124, 91 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1st Dist.
1970), involving a 14-year old who lied to his mother, telling her he was going to
spend the weekend with friends at a beach 40 miles from his home, and who thereafter did not return on time, but was instead apprehended 600 miles away at the Mexican border. See also In re J.M., 57 N.J. 442, 273 A.2d 355 (1971) (affirming PINS
adjudication based on possession of an eyedropper and a hypodermic needle); In re
A.R., 57 N.J. 71, 269 A.2d 529 (1970) (upholding PINS adjudication based on sniffing carbona); Rusecki v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 299, 201 N.W.2d 832 (1972) (affirming
PINS adjudication where child was found "half naked and incoherent"; record indicated that child was a drug abuser).
216. In re David S., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1124, 1127-28, 91 Cal. Rptr. 261, 263 (1st
Dist. 1970); but see In re Henry G., 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 284, 104 Cal. Rptr. 585,
590 (2d Dist. 1972), discussed in notes 263-65 infra and accompanying text. In
jurisdictions such as New York, where a PINS child is defined as one who is "habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent," N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr §
712(b) (McKinney 1975), the use of the conjunctive "and" would appear to preclude
the type of statutory interpretation utilized by the court in the David S. case. See
In re Bordone, 33 App. Div. 2d 890, 307 N.Y.S.2d 527 (4th Dept. 1969). See also
In re Nelly 0., _ App. Div. 2d - , 381 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1st Dept. 1976) (affirming
PINS adjudication where girl struck her mother twice, ran away from home and from
a shelter facility; such conduct was held not to be an isolated incident).
217. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-401(g)(3) (Supp. 1975); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. § 2151.022(G) (Page Supp. 1974); UNIFORM JUVENILE CoURT Acr § 2(4)
(iii).

218. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022(B) (Page Supp. 1974).
219. See In re Carpenter, 31 Ohio App. 2d 184, 287 N.E.2d 399 (1972). The
District of Columbia statute also defines PINS conduct so as to include habitual truancy and "an offense commitable only by children," D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2301
(8) (A) (i), (ii) (Supp. 1973); it seems unlikely, however, that the District of Columbia courts could reach the same result as the Carpenter court. Since the District
of Columbia Code requires an additional finding that the child "is in need of care
or rehabilitation" before a PINS disposition may be entered, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 162301 (8)(B), (17) (Supp. 1973), it is doubtful whether a single day of truancy would
afford a basis for such a finding. See note 39 supra. But cf. In re Doe, 87 N.M.
466, 535 P.2d 1092 (1975), reversing a delinquency finding based on the child's violation of a curfew ordinance and his possession of alcoholic beverages, because neither constituted a crime. The court intimated, however, that a PINS petition making
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In dismissing charges based on relatively minor misconduct,
courts have also interpreted PINS statutes so as to fashion a de
minimi" defense which, unlike the closely related isolated incident
theory, may be applied to either a single act or repeated misbehavior.
Thus, because the throwing of a firecracker that resulted in the
accidental injury of another child was considered a "boyish prank," a
minor was not "without parental control" or "incorrigible."220 The
use of vulgar and abusive language toward taunting schoolmates on
several occasions was also deemed insufficient to prove that a child
was "in need of supervision" or "in need of correction and training
which the parents cannot provide."221 In reversing PINS findings
based upon allegations that two boys had thrown stones at a house
during the night, a Virginia court in effect combined the de minimis
and isolated incident theories, noting, "There is nothing in the record
to suggest that the accused were inherently vicious or incorrigible. To
classify an infant as delinquent because of a youthful prank, or for a
mere single violation of a misdemeanor statute . . . in this day of
numberless laws and ordinances is offensive to our sense of justice.
"222

The use in the foregoing cases of terms such as "youthful prank"
such allegations might not be "jurisdictionally defective." 87 N.M. at 468, 535 P.2d
at 1094. In addition to requiring proof that the child committed the acts alleged,
New Mexico law mandates a finding, supported by clear and convincing, competent
evidence, that the child is in need of care and rehabilitation prior to entry of a dispositional order. N.M. STAT• .ANN. § 13-14-28(F) (Supp. 1973). In view of these
statutory provisions, the court might merely have been saying that a PINS petition
alleging such acts would not be subject to dismissal on its face.
220. In re Alley, 174 Wis. 85, 182 N.W. 360 (1921). Cf. In re D.B.P., 512
S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (no violation of a probation order in a delinquency case, where the child's truancy stemmed from circumstances beyond his control). See also Moore v. State, 111 Tex. Crim. 461, 14 S.W.2d 1041 (1929)
(reversing PINS adjudication because, although there was proof that the girl was
frequently seen on the streets at night, there was no evidence of an illegitimate purpose on her part).
221. Young v. State, 120 Ga. App. 605, 171 S.E.2d 756 (1969); accord, M.S.K.
v. State, 131 Ga. App. 1, 205 S.E.2d 59 (1974) (reversing adjudication of delinquency against 11-year-old boy for slight sexual molestation). In both of these cases,
there are indications that the trial courts' adjudications were racially motivated.
Compare E.S. v. State, 134 Ga. App. 724, 725, 215 S.E.2d 732, 734 ( 1975) (affirming a delinquency adjudication based on "a long period of harassment • • ., entry on
the property of another after strict orders to stay away, destruction of property, and
an eloquent use of obscene language," and distinguishing the above Georgia cases on
the ground that they involved "competing disciplinary claims" of the public schools),
Cf. Gonzales v. School Dist., 8 Pa. Comrnnw. 130, 136-37, 301 A.2d 99, 103 (1973),
where the court intimated that school tardiness and absences from class do not afford
a basis for a PINS finding of incorrigibility.
222. Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 343, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946). The
court's opinion makes it clear that, under the Virginia statute in effect at the time
of the Jones decision, delinquency included PINS activity.
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suggests an additional prerequisite for a PINS finding. In committing the acts alleged, the child must be shown to have mens rea or
some form of evil intent and must have strayed beyond typical
juvenile acts of rebelliousness or mischief. As the Virginia court
pointed out, a failure to distinguish between mischievous and evil
intentions would result in "an inclusion of so many [children] in the
[PINS] classification that the word would lose its accepted meaning. "223 Thus, the absence of the requisite state of mind may provide
a sufficient defense.
A final defense based upon statutory interpretation has been
established by court holdings that a child is not beyond parental
control within the meaning of the PINS statute if the parent has
approved or condoned the alleged misconduct. One court found that
absence from school for fifty-seven days did not establish habitual
truancy under the statute, because the absences were not "in defiance
of parental authority" and in fact were "consented to by . . . [the
child's] father." 224 Another appellate tribunal reversed a finding
that a child was beyond parental control because she frequented the
headquarters of a radical group, wherein explosives were found, on
the ground that she had received her mother's permission and full
approval. 225
223. 185 Va. at 343, 38 S.E.2d at 448; see Ossant v. Millard, 72 fyfisc. 2d 384,
388, 339 N.Y.S.2d 163, 168 (Fam. Ct. 1972) ("[T]he basic principles of the criminal law are relevant in dealing with 'illegal' absentees. It is therefore, fundamental
that the . . . absentee pupil must be found to have a conscious underlying intent . . .
to violate the . . . Compulsory Education Law before such [PINS] sanctions may
be invoked"); State v. Lefebvre, 91 N.H. 382, 386, 20 A.2d 185, 188 (1941) (children of Jehovah's Witnesses suspended from school for failing to salute flag, adjudicated PINS for failure to attend school, and placed in state training school; in reversing, the court stated, "We find no intent of the legislature to treat as delinquents
those who are excluded from attendance because they act in good faith from conscientious motives . . .").
224. In re Alley, 174 Wis. 85, 90, 182 N.W. 360, 362 (1921); see Ossant v. Millard, 72 Misc. 2d 384, 339 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Fam. Ct 1972), dismissing a PINS petition founded on truancy, where the parents refused to permit their children to attend
school because of a dispute with school authorities concerning the school bus route.
But see T.A.F. v. Duval County, 273 S.2d 15 (Fla. App. 1973) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 283 S.2d 564 (Fla. 1975), affirming a PINS finding based on truancy, even
though the children were prevented by their parents from attending school because
of the latter's view that "race mixing as practiced in the public schools was sinful
and contrary to their religious beliefs." 273 S.2d at 16. Cf. In re Arnold, 12 Md.
App. 384, 278 A.2d 658 (1971) (delinquency adjudication also involving PINS conduct such as minor misbehavior in school; although the court reversed the training
school disposition because the trial judge read the probation report during the factfinding hearing, the record reveals that the parents were never notified about such
misconduct, and thus there could be no finding that they failed to exercise appropriate control).
225. In re Slawson, 7 Ore. App. 317, 490 P.2d 1022 (1971). See also In re McMillan, 21 N.C. App. 712, 205 S.E.2d 541 (1974), in which the North Carolina
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The cases discussed in this section illustrate that PINS statutes
were not intended to remedy all instances of juvenile disobedience,
even those involving repeated acts. PINS legislation should instead
be construed to embody three substantive requirements: ( 1) that the
acts_ of which the child is accused be of sufficient magnitude to cause
substantial injury to the child or others; (2) that such acts be the
result of intentional malevolence, rather than of mere mischievousness; and (3) that persons in authority have been unable to deter this
misconduct with substantial, good-faith efforts.226
B.

Exhaustion of Non-Judicial Remedies

A persuasive argument can be made that a PINS action should be
defeated by proof that the petitioning party has failed to utilize nonjudicial remedies, such as those available at community welfare agencies, prior to commencement of court proceedings. A defense based
upon the existence of non-judicial remedies may be raised regardless
of the seriousness or the frequency of the alleged misconduct.
A number of authorities have recognized that the PINS jurisdiction should be exercised only as a last resort to remedy the most
serious forms of continuing juvenile misbehavior. Thus, the President's Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency observed, "[E]specially in
instances of conduct . . . [that] would not be criminal for an adult,
it is of the greatest importance that all alternative measures be employed before recourse is had to court."227 Similarly, the 1962
committee report that accompanied New York's innovative PINS
legislation viewed the juvenile court as "essentially a last resort
[whose] . . . energies and processes should be reserved for children
requiring -official supervision."228 A Georgia appellate court, in reversing a judgment committing a fourteen-year-old girl to a state
agency until her twenty-first birthday for use of obscene language in
school, noted:
Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's finding that three siblings, aged nine, twelve
and fifteen, were ''undisciplined" children because they had, with parental approval,
been absent from school one day.
226. See Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, _, 270 N.E.2d 389, 393
(1971), construing the state's stubborn child law so as to require proof that a person
in authority gave a lawful and reasonable command, that the child's refusal to obey
was "wilfull, obstinate and persistent for a period of time," and that there was an
actual refusal to obey and not merely a difference of opinion or disagreement.
227. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26. Cf. Note, A Proposal for the
More Effective Treatment of the "Unruly" Child in Ohio: The Youth Services Bureau, 39 U. C!N. L. REV. 275, 282 (1970).
228. REPORT OF JOINT LEGISLATIVE CoMM. ON COURT REORGANIZATION, reprinted
in McKinney's Session Laws of New York 3428, 3436 (1962).
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[S]uch conduct as proved here is usually the subject of disciplinary
action by school officials without the necessity of invoking the aid of
the courts. . . . To bring all students accused of this or similar
deeds of misconduct before the courts would be taking advantage of
the real purpose of and necessity for the Juvenile Court Act and
would place burdens on the courts which rightfully belong to parents
and school officials. It is only when such corrective measures are
totally without avail that the courts should be asked to invoke the
sometimes awesome consequences of the Iaw. 229
Despite such conclusions, there are few reported PINS cases in which
courts have required the parties to avail themselves of community
resources as a prerequisite to judicial action. 230
In an attempt to limit access to the juvenile court, over half of the
states have established intake procedures for the adjustment of cases
not requiring judicial intervention and, if necessary, for the referral of
the parties to appropriate community agencies. 231 Though some
might argue that these intake procedures automatically exhaust nonjudicial solutions, the process in fact has serious shortcomings. These
include insufficient staffing for conducting investigations, 232 vague
criteria for determining which cases warrant diversion, 233 restriction
of the adjustment process to cases in which the child admits the
misconduct alleged, 234 the tendency of probation personnel to accede
to parental demands, 235 and the power of the petitioning party to
229. Young v. State, 120 Ga. App. 605, 606-07, 171 S.E.2d 756, 757 (1969); accord, M.S.K. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 1, 205 S.E.2d 59 (1974), discussed in note 221
supra. Cf. E.S. v. State, 134 Ga. App. 724, 215 S.E.2d 732 (1975), discussed in
note 221 supra. See also In re Alley, 174 Wis. 85, 182 N.W. 360 (1921); Ossant
v. Millard, 72 Misc. 2d 384, 339 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Fam. Ct. 1972).
230. See cases cited in note 229 supra. See also NEWSWEEK, Sept. 8, 1975, at
72, col. 1, quoting retired New York juvenile court Judge Justine Wise Polier: "'parents file status petitions only when they are at their wits end . . . [and] when they
are terrified that the children are going to destroy themselves or commit a really serious crime.'" This contention appears to be at odds with the Yale Law Journal
study of the New York Family Court, which found, inter alia, that two thirds of the
PINS cases analyzed were withdrawn or dismissed. YALE PINS STUDY, supra note
33, at 1399. See also E. WAKIN, supra note 29, at 12-13.
231. See notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text.
232. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 18; E. WAKIN, supra note 29, at 101;
see also L. PORER, supra note 156, at 67-83; Kelley, Schulman, & Lynch, Decentralized Intake and Diversion: The Juvenile Court's Link to the Youth Service Bureau,
27 JUV. JUSTICE 3 (1976).
233. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17; E. WAKIN, supra note 29, at 42.
See YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1399 n.107 ("Probation intake decisions
and court dispositional decisions operate at irrational cross-purposes: Those factors
at intake which are typically associated with a case sent to court are the same factors
that characterize cases which are withdrawn or dismissed").
234. See, e.g., MoNT. REv. CODES .ANN. § 10-1210(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975);
UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT Acr § lO(a)(l); E. WAKIN, supra note 29, at 41-42.
235. YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1395.
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maintain a court action despite the intake department's contrary
recommendation. 236
Moreover, if statutory provisions for intake adjustment precluded
assertion of the exhaustion defense, the result would be to insulate
intake decisions from judicial review and thereby to circumscribe the
power of the court to assure the correct application of the intake
process in particular cases. 237 The necessity for proper utilization of
the intake procedure was recognized by a New York court in a recent
case of first impression, In re Charles C.. 238 The court held that a
juvenile charged with delinquency did not lose the right to intake
procedures by his failure to appear at a probation interview. Construing the statutory requirement that a child must be found "in need
of supervision, treatment or confinement" before being adjudicated a
delinquent, the judge in effect ruled that there could be no such
finding or adjudication in this case in the absence of utilization of the
intake procedure. The court thus held that, notwithstanding the
victim's objection, it was empowered to refer the child to intake for an
adjustment decision even after a petition had been filed against
him.2a9
The importance of the Charles C. case is that, on the basis of a
statutory requirement that a child be "in need of supervision," it
recognizes judicial power to review intake decisions. Although the
court's ruling was in response to an intake determination based on a
procedural default, ·the judge's decision required consideration of the
merits of that default (i.e., whether the child's failure to appear for the
intake interview was excusable). This power of review could readily
be extended to permit courts to pass on whether an intake depart236. See note 32 supra.
237. The argument that intake procedures provide an effective screening mechanism for minor misconduct is controverted by such cases as Young v. State, 120 Ga,
App. 605, 171 S.E.2d 756 (1969), and M.S.K. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 1, 205 S.E.2d
59 (1975), discussed in note 229 supra and accompanying text, inasmuch as Georgia
law included intake adjustment provisions. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1001 (Supp,
1975). See also Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47, 55 (Alas. 1971) (concluding that delinquents were not entitled to grand jury indictments, the Alaska court noted that the
intake adjustment process was more advantageous to the child, but was constrained
to observe that there was no evidence it had been utilized in this case: "Our statement here that the [intake] ... procedures offer a more than adequate substitute
for grand jury indictment indicates how important it is that these procedures be followed in every case").
238. 371 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Fam. Ct. 1975).
239. 371 N.Y.S.2d at 587, construing N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr § 734 (McKinney
1962), as amended N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr § 734 (McKinney 1975). For reasons
beyond his control, the child did not appear for his original intake interview, which
resulted in a petition being filed and an arrest warrant being issued.
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ment's refusal on substantive grounds 240 to adjust a case was appropriate. Because intake departments serve as mechanisms for the diversion of juveniles from the court to community agencies, judicial power
to review their decisions on the merits would in effect constitute
recognition of the exhaustion defense.
Inasmuch as the Charles C. decision was based on construction of
language commonly found in PINS statutes, even courts that are in
jurisdictions without intake procedures could conclude that a child
was not "beyond parental control," "incorrigible," or "in need of
supervision" within the meaning of the particular state's statute,241
unless the parent had previously attempted to exercise his or her
authority by using community-based facilities for coping with intrafamily conflicts. 242
The utilization of an exhaustion requirement would accord well
with the strong preference, reflected in legislation and case law pertaining to juveniles, for selection of the dispositional alternative that
least restricts a child's freedom. Numerous statutes provide that it is
preferable for treatment of the child to be "in his own home," 243
240. For example, that a court hearing -would be in the interests of the public
and child. See Tux. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.03(a) (1) (1975). Indeed, the Charles
C. court did consider such substantive factors as the child's age, prior record, and
home and school life. 371 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
241. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(8) (1973) (defining a PINS child as
one who is habitually disobedient and in need of care or rehabilitation); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 43-201(5)(a) (1974) (including as a PINS child one who is not controlled
by his or her parents). The Nebraska statute also includes in its statement of purpose the following: ''To provide for the intervention of the juvenile court in the interest of any child who is within the provisions of this act, with due regard to
parental rights and capacities and the availability of non-judicial resources." NEB.
REV. STAT. § 43-201.01(2) (1974).
242. Legislation in a number of states requires school officials to make reasonable
efforts to correct the situation before a PINS application based on truancy can be
made to the juvenile court See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & lNSTNS. CoDE § 601(b) (West
Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. § 17:233 (West Supp. 1975); S.C. LAws ANN. § 21766 (1962) (requiring the truant officer to contact parents "with the object in mind
of interesting nonattending children in school work, and influencing them by means
of persuasion to attend school regularly"). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 2627, 26-28 (Smith-Hurd 1962); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 340.739 (1967) (requiring
that notice be given to parents of truant children). Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565 (1975) (requiring notice and hearing prior to suspension of children from school
for ten days or less); In re John R., 79 Misc. 2d 339, 357 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Fam. Ct.
1974) (evidence relating to suitability of children's school and extent of psychological counseling offered them before truancy petitions were filed held admissible at
dispositional hearing but not at fact-finding hearing).
243. E.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 24A-101 (Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38801 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-63 (1974) ("It is the purpose of this act to
secure for each child coming before the juvenile court such care, guidance, and control, preferably in his own home, as will serve his welfare, and the best interests of
the state; to preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible •.."). See also
UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT § 1 (3).
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while other legislation requires that, before a more restrictive disposition can be entered, there be a finding that "community resources" or
"community-level alternatives" have been "exhausted."244 Similarly,
appellate courts have reversed, or directed reconsideration of, training
school placements where the trial courts had failed to consider less
onerous alternatives.245 Finally, a concept analogous to an exhaustion requirement is reflected in the practice of allowing the waiver of
an alleged delinquent into an adult criminal court only after a finding
that the child cannot benefit from the services available to the juvenile
court. 246 Thus, requiring the exhausion of non-judicial remedies as a
prerequisite for assumption of PINS jurisdiction is, in a sense, a
logical extension of current juvenile court practices in selecting dispositional alternatives.
It is also significant that judicial creation of an exhaustion requirement in the absence of explicit legislation is not unprecedented.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, for example,
"had its origin in a discretionary rule adopted by courts of equity to
the effect that a petitioner will be denied equitable relief when he has
failed to pursue an available administrative remedy by which he
might obtain the same relief." 247 The administrative law requirement of exhaustion has particular force where utilization of agency
expertise is important for resolution of the controversy. 248 Another
244. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.185 (subd. l)(c)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.C.
GEN STAT. §§ 7A-286 (4), (5)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975). See also Aruz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8-261 to 8-265 (1974), establishing "family counseling programs" that the
court may order both parents and children to attend, either before or after entzy of
judgment. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 8-263(A) (1974).
245. See, e.g., In re William S., 10 Cal. App. 3d 944, 950-51, 89 Cal. Rptr. 685,
689 (1970); In re Wooten, 13 Md. App. 521, 284 A.2d 32 (1971); In re Jeanette
P., 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 310 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dept 1970) (per curiam); In re
John H., 48 App. Div. 2d 879, 369 N.Y.S.2d 196 (2d Dept. 1975); Hill v. State,
454 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
246. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Atkins v. State, 259
Ind. 596, 290 N.E.2d 441 (1972); J.E.C. v. State, 225 N.W.2d 245 (Minn. 1975).
In Atkins, the court reversed a waiver to the criminal court that had been entered
because the minors were too old for commitment to the state training school, and
in so doing observed that the statute, "in addition to creating a presumption in favor
of disposing of juvenile matters within the juvenile system, also creates a presumption
in favor of using the least severe disposition available to the juvenile court which
will serve the needs of the case." 259 Ind. at 602, 290 N.E.2d at 445 (emphasis
original),
247. Smith v. United Sates, 199 F.2d 377, 381 (1st Cir. 1952); see Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
248. See, e.g., McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1971); McKart
V. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197-99 (1969). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT§ 20.02 (3d ed. 1972). .
A collateral benefit of such an exhaustion requirement is that it "tends to ensure
that the agency have additional opportunities 'to discover and correct its own errors,'
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judicial creation249 with a similar rationale is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, which applies where the court and an administrative
agency have concurrent original jurisdiction, and which generally
requires the court to defer action where the expertise of the agency is
of particular value. 250 Primary jurisdiction has been characterized as
"a device to prepare the way, if the litigation should take its ultimate
course, for a more informed and precise determination by the Court
of the scope and meaning of the statute as applied to . . . [the]
particular circumstances." 251 In a similar fashion, an exhaustion
requirement in PINS cases would allow the juvenile courts to defer,
whenever possible, to the expertise of community agencies.
In determining whether the exhaustion requirement has been met,
courts might consider the following factors at a pre-trial hearing: 252
1. the amount of time that has elapsed since the child's misbehavior
began;
2. the steps taken by the parent to attempt to resolve the problem
within the family (e.g., discussions between parent and child, reprimands, sanctions);
3. the agency or agencies from which the parent sought assistance
when the foregoing steps were unsuccessful;
4. the length of time spent with the agency, and the procedures it
utilized to resolve the problem;
5. the reasons consultation with the agency was terminated; and
6. the relief the parent is requesting from the court.
Consideration of these factors would lead to dismissal in many inand thus may help to obviate all occasion for judicial review." McGee v. United
States, 402 U.S. 479, 484. Cf. PepsiCo, Inc. v. F.T.C., 472 F.2d 179, 185 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973) (construing section l0(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act that permits judicial review of "final agency action," and suggesting that "[m]any of the considerations supporting the final judgment rule with
respect to appeals from decisions of lower courts are equally present in the case of
agency action: ..• the case may be settled; the reviewing court, in any event, will
be in a better position to assess the matter when all the cards have been played").
249. See K. DAVIS, supra note 248, at § 19.02.
250. See, e.g., United States v. Western Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956)
(exhaustion doctrine "applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an
administrative agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the administrative
process has run its course. 'Primary jurisdiction,' on the other hand, applies where
a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which . . • have been placed
within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for
its views") (citations omitted).
251. Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 498-99 (1958).
252. It would appear preferable to present evidence on the exhaustion issue at
a pre-trial hearing rather than at the adjudicatory hearing itself, because of the possibility that some of the evidence offered will be hearsay and thus possibly inadmissible
at a fact-finding hearing.
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stances. For example, if a parent brings a child to court immediately
after the alleged misbehavior, or without having talked to the child, or
without having gone to any community agency, the petition should be
dismissed. Similarly, if, after having sought community assistance,
the parent terminates consultation because the agency views the problem as familial or parental and recommends therapy for both parent
and child, dismissal would also be warranted.
Adoption of such an exhaustion requirement would, in addition
to providing children with a defense to unnecessary PINS actions,
clearly improve the operation of the juvenile court system. It can
limit access to the juvenile court to mature and responsible parents
who have diligently attempted to resolve intra-family conflicts by the
use of alternative methods, and will thus screen out parents "who too
frequently find . . . [the court] a convenient method both of evading their own responsibilities and of venting their hostility toward their
offspring."253 Thus, the juvenile courts will reinforce the principle that
the primary responsibility for rearing a child belongs not to the state,
but to the parents. 254 Moreover, if care is taken to assure that the
parent does not make only a formal, perfunctory use of the community agency, the juvenile court can limit its caseload to the most
serious forms of juvenile misconduct, since minor infractions and normal adolescent rebelliousness will generally be resolved at the agency
level.2 55 Finally, if the exhaustion requirement is met in all PINS
cases, the court will have the views and recommendations of expert
community agencies to inform its judgment as to the appropriate
interim and final dispositions of every case.
C.

"Contributory Neglect' by Parent

Legislation and judicial decisions in a number of states suggest
that failure of parents or guardians to care properly for their children
may constitute a complete or partial defense to PINS charges. Many
PINS statutes, by their own terms, incorporate defenses based on
parental inadequacies. For example, a number of jurisdictions classify
253. TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 8, at 27. Refusal of a parent to utilize
community-based facilities should result in dismissal of the PINS petition. Where,
however, the child's behavior is life-threatening and necessitates immediate judicial
action, parental refusal to seek treatment in the community could be the basis of a
neglect proceeding.
254. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 157, at 7-8. Cf.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923).
255. If the parent refuses to be cooperative or makes unreasonable demands upon
the child, the agency's report to the court noting that fact should result in dismissal
of the PINS case.
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runaways as PINS only when they have left home "without just
cause." 256 In other states, the PINS statutes proscribe disobedience
only if the parental commands in question are "reasonable and lawful"257 or "reasonable and proper."258 The Maryland statute is still
more emphatic, prohibiting only juvenile disobedience that occurs
"without substantial fault" on the part of a child's parents. 259
Yet many of these same statutes also include a separate provision
that classifies any juvenile misbehavior, whether precipitated by parental deficiencies or not, as PINS conduct. 260 In the California
statute, for example, although one clause prohibits refusal to obey
"reasonable and proper [parental] orders," it is followed by a separate clause that permits a child to be adjudged a PINS if he or she is
"beyond the control" of the parent. 261 Statutes of this type are
internally inconsistent, 262 inasmuch as the "reasonable and proper"
provision can be used to exclude from the PINS jurisdiction behavior
that is related to parental fault, while the "beyond control" category
can be used to condemn the child for the same conduct regardless of
parental blameworthiness.
A California court has suggested an appropriate resolution of this
apparent statutory inconsistency. The trial court in a PINS case had
refused to hear certain evidence tending to show a mother's instability
and the propriety of her child's absences from home, although other
admitted evidence indicated that the mother may have provoked an
assault upon her by the child. 263 The appellate court refused to
sustain a PINS finding where "the breakdown in parental control
256. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-53 (Supp. 1975); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 2552 (Supp. 1975).
251. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-40l(g)(2) (Supp. 1975); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 712A.2(2) (a) (2) (Cum. Supp. 1975); UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT
§ 2(4)(ii).
258. See CAL. WELF. & INsTNs. CODE § 601 (a) (West Supp. 1976).
259. Mo. CTs. & JUD. PRo. ConE ANN.§ 3-801(e)(2) (Supp. 1975).
260. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-53(b), (c) (Supp. 1976); KAN.
STAT. ANN.§§ 38-802(d)(l), (2), (3) (1973); Omo REV. CODE ANN.§§ 2151.022
(A), (C) (Page Supp. 1974); S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 15-1103(9)(b), (d) (1962); W.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-4(3 ), (5) (1966).
261. CAL. WELF. & INsTNs. CODE§ 601(a) (West Supp. 1976).
262. Prior to its amendment in 1975, the internal inconsistency of the California
statute was even more glaring, because, in addition to the provisions noted in the
text, the statute permitted PINS adjudications against children "who from any cause
• . . [are] in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life." CAL.
WELF. & INSTNs. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1975) (emphasis added), as amended,
CAL. WELF. & INSTNS. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1976).
263. In re Henry G., 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 104 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1972); but see
In re David S., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1124, 1127-28, 91 Cal. Rptr. 261, 263 (1970); discussed in notes 214-16 supra and accompanying text.
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[was] because of failings in the parent rather than in the minor," 2M
and, accordingly, it reversed the decision:
We do not at all intimate that Henry's mother was the one at fault
but his counsel should have been allowed to try to show that fact.
Precluding the attempt might well create a situation where the "beyond the control" provisions of ... [the: PINS statute] are used to
avoid the more stringent language of that section relating to one who
persistently or habitually refuses to obey a parent's reasonable and
proper orders or directions. 265
Courts that are confronted with similar statutory inconsistencies
should follow the lead of the California court in disallowing the use of
an open-ended provision to justify a PINS finding based upon conduct that is defensible under the terms of the more specific prohibitions.
The neglect or dependency laws of the various states may also
afford a defense based on parental inadequacies. In some jurisdictions, the statutory definition of a neglected child embraces those who
are also described by the PINS and delinquency provisions, but
"whose conduct results in whole or in part from parental neglect." 266
In many states, the same conduct may be the basis for either a PINS
or a neglect action. For example, a child's failure to attend school can
result in a PINS action, 267 a neglect or dependency proceeding, 268 or
(

264. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 285, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
265. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 285, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 590. See also In re Elmore,
382 F.2d 125, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (in the context of a PINS right to treatment
case, appellate court suggests that, on remand, the juvenile court consider whether
its finding that the child was beyond parental control conflicted with its other finding
that the child was without adequate supervision; juvenile court had previously denied
motion by child's attorney to treat the child as neglected rather than as a PINS).
266. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260-015{l){h) (Cum. Supp. 1975); See Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.13(1) (j) (1957). See also AlUz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201.I0(c) (1974),
treating a child under eight who commits a delinquent or PINS act as a dependent
child. Although very few states prescribe lower age limits for PINS children, see
notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text, there are relatively few PINS cases involving extremely young children. See YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1387 n.25.
When such cases arise, failure of the parent to exercise appropriate control when the
child is so young (e.g., ten years old or less) should afford a strong basis for urging
that PINS charges be dismissed and a neglect petition substituted.
261. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 45-403(3)(a) (Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-53 (Supp. 1976) ("habitually truant"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 70203(b) (Smith-Hurd 1972); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.03(b){2) (Supp. 1975).
Compare Ossant v. Millard, 72 Misc. 2d 384, 339 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Fam. Ct. 1972),
with T.A.F. v. Duval County, 273 S.2d 15 (Fla. App. 1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, 283 S.2d 564 (Fla. 1975), discussed at note 224 supra.
268. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-403(4)(b) (Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-53 (Supp. 1976) ("being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally, or morally"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-4{1)(a) (SmithHurd 1972) ("who is neglected as to ••• education as required by law"); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 51.02(1)(H)(i) (Supp. 1975). See In re Pima County Juvenile Action, 18 Ariz. App. 219, 501 P.2d 395 (1972); Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377
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a complaint against the parent under the compulsory education law. 269
A similar overlap is found in states where a juvenile whose "behavior or condition" is injurious to his or her welfare may be adjudicated
a PINS, while one whose "environment" produces such injury is
deemed neglected. 270 The manner in which courts reconcile these
two groups of statutes will determine whether a child may successfully
urge parental neglect as a defense to a PINS petition.
The reported decisions in cases where a child could arguably be
classified as either a PINS or neglected reflect disparate positions on
the proper exercise of juvenile court jurisdiction. Some courts believe
that if the juvenile misconduct technically falls within the ambit of the
PINS statute, then PINS adjudications are proper, even where parental neglect is causally related to this behavior. A Florida court, for
example, affirmed PINS findings of truancy against two children who
did not attend school solely because of their parents' religious belief
that racial integration of schools was sinful. 271 Similarly, a delinquency finding that was based on the theft of a bag of potato chips
and resulted in a training school commitment was affirmed, even
though the child had previously been adjudicated dependent and had
committed the theft to feed himself. The child's defense based on his
parent's neglect was dismissed as a "specious argument which has no
basis in law." 272
S.W.2d 816 (1964); cf. Galloway v. State, 249 Ala. 327, 31 S.2d 332 (1947); In
re Davis, 114 N.H. 242, 318 A.2d 151 (1974) (original charge was both PINS and
neglect).
269. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1502 (1960); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
10-184, 10-185 (1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 26-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962); TEX.
EDUC. CODE§ 4.25 (1972). See also Commonwealth v. Ross, 17 Pa. Commnw. 105,
330 A.2d 290 (1975); cf. Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964) (parents had been fined on three occasions for refusing to vaccinate their children so
that they could attend school; their continued refusal resulted in this neglect and
guardianship proceeding).
270. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-802(d)(l), (g)(3) (1973); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 15-1103(9) (j), (ll)(i) (1962); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 26-8-6, 268-7.1 (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.12 (Cum. Supp. 1975), 48.13(1)(f)
(1957). See State ex rel. Wiley v. Richards, 253 Iowa 679, 113 N.W.2d 285 (1962)
(sisters eight and twelve years old adjudicated dependent and neglected on the basis
of conduct that other courts might have classified as PINS-use of vulgar language
and roaming the streets at night). Cf. In re Chandler, 230 Ore. 452, 370 P.2d 626
(1962) (13-year-old girl's running away from home results in neglect adjudication).
271. See T.A.F. v. Duval County, 273 S.2d 15 (Fla. App. 1973) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 283 S.2d 564 (Fla. 1975). See also In re Shinn, 195 Cal. App. 2d 683,
16 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1961).
212. In re Blakes, 41 Ill. App. 3d 567, 572, 281 N.E.2d 454, 457 (1972). See
In re Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 1972); In re Gamer, 230 Pa. Super. 476,
326 A.2d 581 (1974) (simultaneous adjudication of child as both PINS and neglected). In Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550,-, 270 N.E.2d 389, 395 n.2
(1971), the child alleged she was denied equal protection of the law because she was
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Other courts, adopting a middle ground, have concluded that,
while p~ental inadequacies do not bar a PINS finding, these deficiencies must be considered in determining the appropriate disposition, at
least insofar as the neglect is related to the child's misbehavior. Thus,
in a case where a girl had left home because of a "bizarre home
environment and family tensions," an order for placement in a training school was reversed, with directions that she be afforded treatment in a more suitable environment.273
Finally, some courts reverse PINS findings where parental neglect
is present, even though the particular juvenile misconduct technically
violates the PINS statute. These courts attempt to determine whether
parental neglect is causally related to the juvenile misconduct in
question, and, on the basis of this inquiry, make either a PINS finding
or a finding of neglect. 274 This approach renders PINS and neglect
findings mutually exclusive and precludes PINS findings where parental neglect has directly contributed to the PINS behavior. Thus, a
PINS finding based on truancy and disobedience to the child's father
was reversed, and a neglect finding substituted, where the probation
report indicated that the boy's home was filthy and that, because of ill
health, his father was unable to exercise proper supervision. 276 Anbrought to court as a PINS rather than as a neglected child; the court rejected this
argument, holding that there was a reasonable distinction between PINS and neglected juveniles. Accord, In re Jackson, 6 Wash. App. 962, 497 P.2d 259 (1972).
273. In re Arlene H., 38 App. Div. 2d 570, 328 N.Y.S.2d 251 (2d Dept. 1971).
Cf. People v. Grieve, 131 Ill. App. 2d 1078, 267 N.E.2d 19 (1971). In In re Mario,
65 Misc. 2d 708, 317 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Fam. Ct. 1971), the court indicated that the
parent's inadequacies are a defense to PINS charges only where they have a direct
causal connection to the juvenile misbehavior, and that generalized passive neglect
does not bar either a PINS finding or placement in a state training school if the
child's conduct otherwise warrants such a disposition. Cf. In re Kenneth S., App.
Div., 2d Dept., N.Y.L.J., May 13, 1976, at 11, col. 6 (remanding a case in which
the child had been adjudicated both a PINS and a delinquent, with direction that the
trial court conduct a supplemental hearing as to whether the child should be placed
in a facility for delinquents or one for PINS; by analogy, this case lends support to
the dispositional modification approach for "neglected PINS" discussed in text accompanying this note). See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1116(a)(l) (Cum. Supp.
1914), quoted in note 162 supra.
274. If there is insufficient evidence to sustain either a PINS or a neglect finding,
the case can simply be dismissed. See In re Pima County, 18 Ariz. App. 219, 501
P.2d 395 (1972); In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. App. 1953). See generally RBVI•
SION COMMITIEE NOTE, 1955 to WIS, STAT. ANN. §§ 48.13(i), (j) (1957).
215. In re Paul H., 47 App. Div. 2d 853, 365 N.Y.S.2d 900 (2d Dept. 1975)
(per curiam). Under New York law, the court on its own motion may, at any time
in the proceedings, substitute a neglect petition for a PINS or delinquency petition,
N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 716(b) (McKinney 1975). See In re Richard C., 43 App.
Div. 2d 862, 352 N.Y.S.2d 15 (2d Dept. 1974) (per curiam), reversing a training
school placement of an adjudicated delinquent on the ground, inter alia, that it was
an abuse of discretion not to substitute a neglect petition when child's mother repeatedly failed to appear at the dispositional hearing.
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other appellate court ruled that the habitual absence of a fifteen-yearold boy from a shelter for neglected children did not warrant a
finding of ungovernability because the child, who had previously been
declared neglected, left only to visit his mother; the court therefore
reversed both the PINS finding and the boy's placement at the state
training school. 276
The third approach is preferable,277 since it avoids attaching the
stigma of a PINS finding to a child whose parent is at least partially to
276. In re Lloyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1st Dept. 1970). See
P.S.M. v. State, 469 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), reversing a PINS finding on
the technical ground that, although the petition alleged that the child left home without permission of her "parents," there was no evidence of lack of consent by the
father. The court described in considerable detail the lack of parental supervision,
referring to the girl's alcoholic father, mentally disturbed brother, and mother who
was away working all day. In remanding, the court noted, "[T]he evidence has not
been fully developed. • • • It is obvious that appellant's case requires the attention
of the Juvenile Court." 469 S.W.2d at 15.
277. Although this approach may result in the placement of PINS children whose
misbehavior was the result of parental inadequacies with neglected children who have
engaged in no overt misconduct, there is no inconsistency between this position and
the view expressed in the text at note 107 supra that PINS and delinquent children
should not be commingled. Placement of PINS and neglected children together
would seem to create little danger that the neglected juvenile will be led astray or
harmed by the PINS child, since the latter's conduct is confined to behavior that is
recognized as a child's method of externalizing problems and as a form of juvenile
rebelliousness. In contrast, delinquents have by definition crossed the line of criminality, and there probably is a greater likelihood of inciting emulation of this adult
form of antisocial conduct, e.g., there is a certain panache about following the lead
of a local Bonnie or Clyde that is not present with respect to truancy and staying
out late without permission. Commingling of PINS and delinquents, which most
often takes place in maximum security facilities, also effectively labels the PINS child
as one who is so bad that he or she must be confined with those who have committed crimes. See generally LEAA .ANNOUNCEMENT ON DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION,
supra note 2, at 5-8, 10; STONE COMMISSION, AN INQUIRY INTO TilE JUVENILE CENTERS OPERATED BY TiiE DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 11-14
(1971 ).
Although it might be argued that some PINS children have in fact perpetrated
criminal acts and thus present the same sort of dangerous influence to neglected children as delinquents do to PINS, this danger is diminished because there bas been
no formal recognition of criminality through a court adjudication to that effect. To
the extent that children's perceptions of their peers are influenced by adult labelling,
the absence of a delinquency finding increases the likelihood that these children will
be viewed merely as braggarts and that they will have little power to sway other juveniles in the direction of criminality. The potential for influence may be heightened,
however, where the PINS finding is predicated solely on a criminal act. See generally Werthman, The Function of Social Definitions in the Development of Delinquent Careers, in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 155.
While it is true that neglected, PINS and delinquent children are sometimes
placed together in nonsecure, private residential treatment facilities, the labelling
process is not nearly as severe in such situations. The fact that placement is not
in a maximum security center generates an understanding that the children are there
for treatment of juvenile problems rather than for punishment of crimes in a jaillike setting. Cf. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 590-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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blame for the juvenile's misconduct. 278 Furthermore, it requires the
trial court to make a broad inquiry into the causes of the child's
misconduct, and thus ensures a judgment that is based on an assess•
ment of the blameworthiness of both parent and child. 270 This may
be contrasted to the narrow focus of the first approach, which, like a
criminal proceeding, restricts the relevant inquiry to the question of
whether the accused committed the acts alleged. 280 Moreover, the
first two approaches, by reserving the neglect category for children
who passively internalize parental abuse, in effect penalize those who
manifest their feelings of rejection in overt misbehavior.
The third approach will also inhibit the unwarranted exercise of
discretion by which judges, aware of the dearth of residential treat•
ment centers yet assured of the availability of training school facili•
ties, make PINS findings despite the presence of parental neglect. 281
To the extent that a PINS adjudication is predicated on the existence
of resources rather than on the child's needs, the courts are allowing
fiscal constraints to influence and distort the determination of culpa•
bility. 282 By acquiescing in these constraints, the courts reduce pres•
278. See notes 8, 193 supra, discussing the stigma accompanying a PINS adjudication.
279. See In re LJoyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 387, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421 (1st Dept.
1970) (after a Jengthy recitation of the facts, the court concluded, "A careful review
of this record indicates that this appellant is a 'neglected child' rather than 'a person
in need of supervision'. . • . While there is ample support for the finding that appellant habitually absented himself from the Children's Center, this conduct does not
warrant a finding that he was habitually disobedient or ungovernable").
280. See In re Blakes, 4 Ill. App. 3d 567, 571-72, 281 N.E.2d 454, 457 (1972).
281. See LEAA ANNOUNCEMENT ON DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 2, at
8; JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED, supra note 55, at 13, 105. State Jaw generally
prohibits the placement of neglected children in state training schools. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-24l(A) (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-321(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1975). The Pennsylvania statute provides: "Unless a child found to
be deprived is also found to be delinquent, he shall not be committed to or confined
in an institution or other facility designed or operated for the benefit of delinquent
children." In Pennsylvania, PINS are included within the delinquency classification.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975). See also Galloway v. State,
249 Ala. 327, 31 S.2d 332 (1947); In re Slay, 245 Miss. 294, 147 S.2d 299 (1962);
cf. Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.!. 1972)
(right-to-treatment case involving placement of delinquent, PINS and neglected children together in secure detention facilities). For additional reasons prompting judicial preference for treatment of children as PINS rather than as neglected, see notes
76-80 supra and accompanying text.
282. Compare In re Blakes, 4 Ill. App. 3d 567, 281 N.E.2d 454 (1972) (affirming placement in state training school on the ground, inter alia, that the cost of private placement was prohibitive), with City & County v. Juvenile Ct., 182 Colo. 157,
161, 511 P.2d 898, 900 (1973) (denying writ of prohibition in action brought by
Welfare Department to vacate juvenile court order placing PINS child in a particular
private facility; one of the arguments raised by petitioner was that "the City had no
money allocated for this particular placement"). See also In re L., 24 Ore. App.
257, 546 P.2d 153 (1976) (state contended it had insufficient funds to provide
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sure for the creation of sufficient facilities for neglected problem
children. 283
VI.

CONCLUSION

The deficiencies of the PINS jurisdiction can be mitigated if, at
adjudicatory hearings, there is vigorous assertion of defenses such as
contributory neglect and failure to exhaust non-judicial remedies, as
well as defenses, based on strict adherence to statutory requirements,
that seek exclusion of conduct which is de minimis, condoned or
isolated. Utilization of these defenses by zealous advocates may
render the PINS jurisdiction nugatory just as analogous defenses
developed in the Talmud284 prevented enforcement of the Biblical
sanction against "stubborn and rebellious" sons. 285
According to the Talmud, the son286 was subject to prosecution
only if he had defied both father and mother, and only if both parents
proper care for neglected child who repeatedly ran away from placement facility;
court ordered termination of state agency's custody if it was unable to provide appropriate treatment). See generally JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED, supra note 55,
at 37, pointing out that the median annual cost per child at the New York State
Training School during 1970-1971 was $10,008.
283. Cf. In re Lloyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1st Dept. 1970),
discussed in note 276 supra and accompanying text The court observed that "the
provision of proper facilities is the responsibility of the legislature and the legislative
failure in that regard does not warrant circumvention of the statute." 33 App. Div.
2d at 387, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
284. The Talmud consists of interpretations and elaborations of the Mishnah,
which is in tum a commentary on the Old Testament and a codification of basic
Jewish law. The Mishnah was completed circa 200 C.E. and the Talmud, circa 500
C.E. ENCYCLOPEDIA DICTIONARY OF JUDAICA 419, 585 (Wigoder ed. 1974); see
generally 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, TALMUD BABYLONIA 755-71 (1971). While we
are not suggesting that resort to the Talmud is necessary to validate any of the defenses discussed in this article, it is instructive to examine the manner in which this
ancient counterpart of the PINS statute was restrictively construed, even though
framed in mandatory terms. Reference to the Talmud as an aid to interpretation of
contemporary law is not unprecedented. See In re Juan R., N.Y.L.J., Oct 28, 1975,
at 9, col. 4, where a New York Family Court Judge utilized Talmudic principles of
statutory construction to avoid a determination of unconstitutionality with respect to
a paternity law.
285. See generally F. LUDWIG, supra note 22, at 12-13.
286. Daughters appear to have been exempted from the law. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 8:1, at 473 (Soncino ed. 1935) [hereinafter SANHEDRIN]. In contrast, today a majority of girls in the juvenile court are referred on the basis of PINS
charges. See, e.g., TEXAS Youm COUNCIL, TEXAS JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS FOR
1973, at 10 (1975) (52.6 per cent of girls referred to court for disobedience, 1.8 per
cent for immoral conduct); YALE PINS SnmY, supra note 33, at 1387 n.26 (62 per
cent of PINS cases in New York study were brought against girls). It would appear
that statutes providing higher age limits for girls than for boys subject to the court's
jurisdiction are unconstitutional. See, e.g., In re Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286
N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972); cf. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
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concurred in the prosecution. 287 Through the restrictive interpretation of the word "son," whose meaning was limited to one who was
thirteen and thus sufficiently mature to bear criminal responsibility,
but not yet old enough to be a "man," the period of indictment was
limited to three months following the thirteenth birthday. 288
The offense consisted of two elements: (1) repeated defiance and
reviling of the parents, and (2) gluttony and drunkenness. 280 The
latter element could only be satisfied by consumption of specified
minimum amounts of food and drink;200 because these quantities were
so large that a child could not afford to purchase them, the law was
further interpreted to require that the son have stolen money from his
father for that purpose. 201 Thus, while the Talmud recognized that
the son's behavior would be predictive of future criminal conduct,
that recognition was based on a finding of a criminal act by the son
against the father and on a determination that his addictive gluttony
could only be appeased by further criminal acts against his parents
and others.292
Moreover, prosecution was not allowed if the parents possessed
certain characteristics. A son was not to be deemed stubborn and
rebellious "if his mother [was] not fit for his father," as in the case of
violation by the mother of the laws against incest. 203 Thus, it can be
inferred that if the parents had set a bad example for their son by
themselves acting unlawfully, they were barred from levelling charges
287. SANHEDRIN 8:4, at 482-83. If one parent was dead or refused to join in the
charges, the son could not be prosecuted. "Either of them could condone the offense
and withdraw the complaint at any time before the conviction." M. ELON, THE
PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAw 492 (1975). Compare the condonation defense discussed
in notes 224-25 supra and accompanying text.
288. SANHEDRIN 8:1, at 465-68. Under an alternative interpretation, the indictment period was extended to six months after the thirteenth birthday. M. ELON,
supra note 287, at 491. Compare the mens rea defense discussed in note 223 supra
and accompanying text and the infancy defense discussed in notes 22, 266 supra.
289. M. ELON, supra note 287, at 491-92. Compare the isolated incident defense
discussed in notes 202-19 supra and accompanying text.
290. SANHEDRIN 8:2, at 473-75, 479-81.
291. SANHEDRIN 8:3, at 482. Raschi, who lived in the 11th century and was a
leading commentator on the Bible and Talmud, wrote, "A stubborn and rebellious
son is not culpable until he has stolen and eaten half a manah of meat and has drunk
half a log of wine." THE PENTATEUCH AND RAscm's COMMENTARY: DEUTERONOMY
196 (Ben Isaiah & Sharfman ed. 1949).
292. SANHEDRIN 8:5, at 488, states: "Did the Torah {the first five books of the
Old Testament] decree that the rebellious son shall be brought before Beth din [the
Jewish court of law] and stoned merely because he ate . . . [and drank too much]?
But the Torah foresaw his ultimate destiny. For at the end, after dissipating his
father's wealth, he would still seek to satisfy his accustomed gluttonous wants but
being unable to do so, go forth at the cross roads and rob." (footnote omitted).
293. SANHEDRIN 8 :3, at 482-83.
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of illegality against him. In addition, a complaint of rebelliousness
was precluded if the parents were not "alike in voice" when they
admonished their son. 294 This can be interpreted to mean that if the
mother and father gave the son inconsistent directions, they were
failing to provide him with a cohesive and disciplined home life, and
that this parental shortcoming could be a defense to the charge that
he was stubborn and rebellious. 295
Even if the son had committed all the elements of the "crime" and
the parents were in no way deficient, he was brought first before a
three-judge court where, upon conviction, he was flogged and warned
of the consequences if he persisted in such conduct. 296 It was only if
he thereafter continued to violate the law that he could be brought
before the elders of the city, which was a court of twenty-three
persons, and be made subject to the death penalty. 297
There appears to be no recorded instance of the execution of a
stubborn and rebellious son. 298
294. Id. at 483.
295. Compare the defense of contributory neglect discussed in text at notes 25683 supra. Some of the Talmudic interpretations concerning parental traits are rather
artificial and appear to have been added to restrict the law's applicability. For example, the son of a parent who had no hands was exempt because of the Biblical
requirement that the parents "lay hold on him." SANHEDRIN 8:4, at 484.
296. SANHEDRIN 8:4, at 484-85,
291. Id. "He is admonished in the presence of three and flagellated. If he transgresses again after this, he is to be tried by a court of twenty three and cannot be
sentenced to stoning unless the first three are present. . . ." Witnesses to the admonition were required, since the son could not be executed on the basis of only his
parents' testimony. Id. at 484-85. Compare the defense of exhaustion of non-judicial remedies, discussed in text at notes 227-55 supra.
298. SANHEDRIN 8:3, at 483. ''There never has been a 'stubborn and rebellious
son,' and never will be. Why then was the law written? That you may study it
and receive reward." Id. (footnote omitted).

